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SEAMEN, SEAWORTHINESS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF HARBOR WORKERS
Francis L. Tetreault*
Eighty years ago American admiralty courts still regarded the work of
the longshoreman in loading and unloading vessels as a shoreside, non-
maritime activity.' The longshoreman has since won recognition for the
maritime nature of his work, and eight years ago the admiralty court
adopted the injured longshoreman as its favorite ward.' The Supreme
Court in the recent case of Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn3 dubbed as
"seaman" a shoreside carpenter, and, by the accolade, extended to an
indeterminable additional number of harbor workers the right it had
granted longshoremen in Seas Shipping Company v. Sieracki to recover
damages from a fault-free shipowner for injuries resulting from "unsea-
worthiness." Indicative of the progress made by the harbor worker is the
fact that a worker in Hawn's relation to the ship was formerly regarded
as a bare licensee, to whom the shipowner owed no affirmative duty to pro-
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 482, for biographical data.
1 Paul v. The Ilex, 18 Fed. Cas. 1346, No. 10,842, (C.C.D. La. 1876), held the work of
loading and discharging a vessel to be non-maritime in nature in denying the existence of a
maritime lien upon the vessel for the performance of such services.
2 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
3 346 U.S. 406 (1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1, affirming 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952), 1952 A.M.C.
1708, modifying 99 F. Supp. 226 (E. D. Pa. 1951), 1951 A.M.C. 1604, and 100 F. Supp. 338
(E-D. Pa. 1951). Hawn, a shoreside carpenter, while working on shipowner Pope & Talbot's
vessel, slipped on some loose grain, fell through an opening where a hatch cover was missing,
and was injured. Hawn's employer, the Haenn Ship Ceiling Corporation, third party defend-
ant, had been engaged by the United States Army, time charterer of the vessel, to install the
fittings to facilitate the Army's loading of grain. The district court jury found (1) that the
vessel was unseaworthy, (2) that shipowner Pope & Talbot was negligent, (3) that third
party defendant Haenn Corporation was negligent and (4) that the plaintiff Hawn was
17.5% contributorily negligent. The Supreme Court held the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence did not bar his recovery from the shipowner, that the negligence of the shipowner,
Pope & Talbot, Inc., barred its claim for contribution from Haenn Corporation, and that the
plaintiff carpenter was doing "seaman's work" and was entitled to rely on an absolute war-
ranty of seaworthiness.
4 328 U.S. 85 (1946), 1946 A.M.C. 698.
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vide a "safe place to work." 5 The judicial process by which the Supreme
Court has (1) created a doctrine enabling one group of litigants to recover
damages from another group on a basis of non-fault liability, and (2)
admitted additional groups to the favored class, is without parallel in
American legal history. The "open sesame" to the favored class is the
word "seaman." The development of the harbor worker's rights to recover
for personal injuries must, therefore, be traced through the rights of the
mariners who were formerly the favored wards of admiralty but have now
been outstripped by their shoreside namesakes.
THE ORIGINS OF MARINERS' REMEDIES FOR SHIPBOARD INJUMRs
The ancient origins of the harbor workers' present remedies for injuries
occurring on shipboard derive from the rights of the mariners who com-
prised the crew and navigated the vessel. Yet none of the fragments of
ancient law which have been preserved to us contain any hint that the
harbor workers who were injured aboard ship possessed rights of recovery
which differed in any way from the remedies available to other workers in
the community who were employed in purely shoreside industrial ac-
tivities.
The text writers without exception credit the tradition that the earliest
codification of maritime law was that of the Island of Rhodes and that it
was reputedly promulgated about 900 B.C.6 A portion of the Rhodesian
law may have been incorporated in the Roman codes but none of the
authenticated provisions so preserved make any specific reference- to the
rights of mariners injured aboard ship. Much of the maritime commerce
of the ancient world was carried in galleys, which by modern standards
required -relatively enormous crews, 7 but the mariners comprising such
crews were largely slaves8 and it is probable that their rights with respect
to personal injury were too nebulous to permit codification or other clear
statement.
The earliest authenticated statement of the rights of mariners in cases
of injury or illness appears in the code promulgated about 1150 A.D. by
Eleanor, Duchess of Guienne, for Oleron, an island lying off the southwest
5 The Germania, 10 Fed. Cas. 255, No. 5,360 (1878), (a workman employed by the cargo
owner to bag a grain cargo held a mere licensee when aboard the vessel).
6 3 Kent Comm. 3, 4 (14th ed. 1896) ; Radin, Roman Law 252 (1927). As to seamen's rights
generally, see Norris, The Law of Seamen (1951); Robinson, Admiralty (1939). See also
Norris, "The Seaman as Ward of Admiralty," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 479 (1954).
7 2 Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire 278 (1887) cites a Roman vessel
which carried 200 crew, 1300 passengers and many tons of cargo; the modem cargo liner
seldom carries a crew in excess of 45-50, including master and officers.
8 5 Frank, Economic Survey of Ancient Rome 252 (1940).
[Vol. 39
RIGHTS OF HARBOR WORKERS
coast of France.' These laws contain what is probably the earliest formal
statement of a system of workmen's compensation; provision was made
that the mariner wounded or falling ill in the service of the ship should
receive his wages and medical treatment at the expense of the ship1" with-
out regard to the manner in which the sickness or injury was incurred,
provided it did not result from his own misconduct. On the other hand, no
consequential damages or indemnity was recoverable for injury resulting
from negligence or other fault on the part of the master or the vessel.
The laws of Wisbuy (modern spelling Visby, capital of Gottland, an
island off the southeast coast of Sweden) are regarded as having been
promulgated about 1266 A.D. and the provisions with respect to the ill-
nesses and injuries of mariners are virtually identical with those of the
laws of Oleron." The laws of Wisbuy, like the laws of Oleron, make no
provision for damages or indemnity to a mariner who is injured through
the neglect or other fault of the ship. The ship-owner had no obligation
to maintain and cure the injured mariner if he received his hurt while do-
ing the merchant's business rather than the ship's.
In 1597 at Lubeck, the laws of the Hanse towns were first published in
the German language. Wisbuy was a member of the Hanse (or Confed-
eracy) and the laws promulgated by the towns of the Hanseatic League
9 The Laws of Oleron, 30 Fed. Cas. 1171 et seq. These, as well as the Laws of Wisbuy, the
Laws of the Hanse towns, and the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, are reprinted as an
Appendix at 30 Fed. Cas. 1171-1216.
10 Art. VI. If any of the mariners hired by the master of any vessel, go out of the ship
without his leave, and get themselves drunk, and thereby there happens contempt to
their master, debates, or fighting and quarrelling among themselves, whereby some happen
to be wounded; in tbis case the master shall not be obliged to get them cured, or in any
thing to provide for them, but may turn them and their accomplices out of the ship; and
if they make words of it, they are bound to pay the master besides: but if by the
master's orders and commands any of the ship's company be in the service of the ship,
and thereby happen to be wounded or otherwise hurt, in that case they shall be cured
and provided for at the costs and charges of the said ship.
Art. VII. If it happens that sickness seizes on any one of the mariners, while in the
service of the ship, the master ought to set him ashore, to provide lodging and candlelight
for him and also to spare him one of the ship-boys, or hire a woman to attend him, and
likewise to afford him such diet as is usual in the ship; that is to say, so much as he had
on shipboard in his health, and nothing more, unless it please the master to allow it him;
and if he will have better diet, the master shall not be bound to provide it for him, unless
it be at the mariner's own cost and charges; and if the vessel be ready for her departure,
she ought not to stay for the said sick party-but if he recover, he ought to have his full
wages, deducting only such charges as the master has been at for him. And if he dies,
his wife or next kin shall have it.
30 Fed. Cas. at 1174-1175.
11 The Laws of Wisby, Arts. XVIII, XJX, XXIII and LII, 30 Fed. Cas. 1191 et seq. Com-
pare the provisions for maintenance, Article 52, with Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523
(1951), 1951 A.M.C. 416, where a seaman falling from a dance hall window after drinking "only
part" of a bottle of wine was held in the ship's service and entitled to maintenance. In view
of the present extent of the doctrine of "maintenance and cure" it is interesting to note that
if the mariner's ailment were a "contagious distemper," Article 52 permitted the master to put
the mariner ashore on the first land with no further obligation.
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were patterned closely after those of Wisbuy. Maintenance and cure, and
wages for the voyage, were paid to mariners who were injured or became
ill in the service of the ship without their misconduct, 2 but for the first
time an indemnity of lifetime maintenance was provided for the mariner
who was maimed and disabled in defending his ship against pirates, with
the provision that the cost of the indemnity should be borne jointly by the
vessel and its cargo. 3 With the single exception of this reward for heroic
services, the laws of the Hanse towns recognize no right in the mariner to
indemnity for personal injuries.
The Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, published in 1681, likewise pro-
vided for the maintenance, cure, and voyage wages of mariners injured
or failing ill in the service of the ship without their misconduct,' 4 but the
award for injuries incurred in defending the ship was limited to cure,
rather than maintenance for life. 'The only bounty provided for wounds
suffered in defending the vessel against pirates was that if death ensued
full wages for the voyage would be paid to the mariner's heirs.'5 The
expenses in connection with mariners wounded in defending the vessel
were treated as a general average responsibility of the cargo and the ves-
sel,'" but there was no provision for the recovery by the seaman of dam-
ages or indemnity from the shipowner for injuries resulting from negli-
gence or other fault.
For many years American courts regarded the ancient codes as stating
the general maritime law governing the relations between the mariner and
the shipowner.17 As late as 1832, Circuit Judge Story'" viewed the obliga-
tion of the vessel and shipowner to a mariner injured in its service as
limited to maintenance and cure, with the possible exception of the un-
usual case where the mariner might have received his injuries in defending
the vessel against some extraordinary peril. In such a case, Judge Storey
said the injured mariner "may be entitled to a more ample compensation,
12 Laws of the Hanse Towns, Arts. XXXIX and XLV, 30 Fed. Cas. 1200.
13 Laws of the Hanse Towns, Art. XXXV, 30 Fed. Cas. 1199, provides:
The seamen are obliged to defend the ship against rovers, on pain of losing their wages;
and if they are wounded they shall be healed and cured at the general charge of the
concerned in a common average. If any one of them is maimed and disabled, he shall be
maintained as long as he lives by a like average.
14 Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Title Fourth, Articles XI and XII, 30 Fed. Cas. 1209.
15 Id. Art. XV.
16 Id. Title Seventh, Article VI, 30 Fed. Cas. 1214.
17 Walton v. The Neptune, 29 Fed. Cas. 142, No. 17,135 (D. Pa. 1800). Judge Peters said:
The Laws of Oleron contain the principles of all the maritime laws of the European
western nations concerned in commerce; with some particular exceptions in particular
cases. They are yet in force and acknowledged in their great and leading principles by
all the trading nations. ...
Ibid.
18 Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832).
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in the nature of a salvage, to indemnify him for any wounds or injuries
sustained in this extraordinary service." "
An American mariner first recovered an indemnity in addition to the
cost of maintenance and cure in 1859 in a case where the master negli-
gently failed to secure shoreside medical attention for the mariner who
had broken both legs, when such attention could have been obtained with-
out any substantial delay to the vessel's voyage.20 The case was regarded
by the court as one involving a negligent breach of the vessel's duty, rec-
ognized in the ancient codes, to provide medical treatment for its injured
mariners.
American courts consistently held that the mariner had no right under
the general maritime law to recover compensatory damages from the ship
or shipowner for injuries suffered through the negligence of the master,
officers, or fellow crew members in failing to warn of temporary dangerous
conditions, 21 in doing work carelessly, 22 or in issuing improvident orders.2 3
The single known exception is The Titan,24 decided in 1885 on the theory
of the "vice principal" exception to the "fellow servant" rule, in line with
the then recently announced views of the Supreme Court with respect to
railroad employees.25 The Titan was expressly considered and disapproved
by the Supreme Court in The Osceola,28 which held that under the general
maritime law, neither the shipowner nor the vessel was liable for compensa-
tory damages for injuries sustained by mariners through the negligent acts
of the masters, officers, or crew members in the giving of orders or the man-
ner in which work was performed.
The LaFollette Act of 1915 27 attempted to provide a remedy for sea-
men injured through the negligence of their superior officers through
partial repudiation of the "fellow servant" doctrine. In Chelantis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 28 however, the Supreme Court held that Congress'
19 Id. at 429.
20 Brown v. Overton, 4 Fed. Cas. 418, No. 2,024 (D. Mass. 1859).
21 The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
22 Jansen v. The Sachem, 42 Fed. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1890). In this case Judge Benedict phrased
the absence of shipowner liability in terms of the "fellow servant" doctrine but indicated that
the shipowner might have been liable if the negligence had been that of the mate rather than
a fellow crew member.
23 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
24 23 Fed. 413 (C.C.S..N.Y. 1885) (negligence of pilot in navigation contributed to collision
causing mariner's injuries).
25 Chicago, N. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377 (1884).
26 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
27 Section 20 of the Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1185. "In any suit to recover damages
for any injuries sustained on board vessel or in its service, seamen having command shall not
be held to be fellow servants with those under their authority."
28 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
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attempt was wholly ineffective because the shipowner's lack of liability
(in excess of maintenance and cure) for injuries to a mariner resulting
from "operating" negligence of other members of the crew did not depend
upon the fellow servant doctrine. The case may be regarded as recogni-
tion by the Supreme Court of the absence of a doctrine of respondeat
superior in maritime torts, at least with respect to injuries to mariners
resulting from the "operating" negligence of other members of the crew.29
In 1920, Congress effectively secured for mariners a remedy against
their employer for injuries resulting from the negligence of other members
of the vessel's complement3 ° by extending to them the remedies made
available to railroad workers under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.31 Thus, by statute, the American mariner, and the foreign mariner
in some circumstances, 32 may recover from his "employer" for injuries
resulting from the "operating" negligence of other members of the vessel's
complement, in addition to his traditional remedies under the general
maritime law.
THE MARINER'S REMEDIES FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM
"UNSEAWORTHINESS"
The terms "seaworthiness" and "unseaworthiness" appear only inciden-
tally and infrequently in the opinions of the courts in mariners' personal
injury cases prior to the decision of The Osceola, although Parsons, in
1869, citing a number of mariners' wage cases, indicated that the general
principles of American maritime law would permit a seaman to recover
from the shipowner for injuries caused by unseaworthiness.33 A number
of American cases34 prior to The Osceola recognized the right of mariners
to recover from the shipowner for the negligent failure of the owner,
master or mate, after reasonable notice and opportunity, to provide proper
appliances or rigging, or to correct dangerous conditions of the vessel or
cargo. Many of these cases were considered and discussed by the Su-
preme Court in The Osceola, and should properly be viewed as "unsea-
worthiness!' cases, although as late as 1879 text writers had failed to
classify "unseaworthiness" as a basis upon which to predicate liability of
29 Cunningham, "Respondeat Superior in Admiralty," 19 Harv. L. Rev. 445 (1906).
30 The Jones Act of June 5, 1920,41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946).
31 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1946).
32 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), 1953 A.M.C. 1210.
33 2 Parsons on Shipping and Admiralty 78, n. 1 (1879).
34 Brown v. The D.S. Cage, 4 Fed. Cas. 367, No. 2002 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1872); Halverson
v. Nisen, 11 Fed. Cas. 310, No. 5,970 (D. Cal. 1876); The Edith Gooden, 23 Fed. 43 (S.D.N.Y.
1885); The Noddleburn, 28 Fed. 855 (D. Ore. 1886); Olson v. Flavel, 34 Fed. 477 (D. Ore.
1888) ; The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592 (C.C.D. Mass. 1890) ; The Frank and Willie, 45 Fed. 494
(SD.N.Y. 1891); The Julia Fowler, 49 Fed. 277 (SJD.N.Y. 1892).
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the shipowner for damages to the mariner injured in the vessel's service."5
In marked contrast, virtually every recent case involving mariner's
injuries, and even those resulting from the assault of a fellow crew mem-
ber,36 mentions the term "seaworthiness" and is decided on the court's
determination whether, in the particular case, the vessel was "unsea-
worthy."
There is so little resemblance between the modern doctrine of "insured
seaworthiness" and its reputed predecessors, that its evolution must be
traced with care.
The ancient codes imposed no duty upon the shipowner and master to
take pains to provide a staunch ship for the benefit of the mariners. Con-
trariwise, they imposed liability on the mariners for any damage to the
cargo which resulted from their failure to discover and disclose to the
merchant and master any unsound gear or rigging.37 Somewhat later,
these codes imposed a duty on the shipowner and master to exercise due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy for the benefit of the cargo,38 but
the ancient laws nowhere impose any such duty for the benefit of the
mariners.39
Although the English Courts in the law of insurance and carriage of
goods, for the benefit of underwriters and cargo owners, gave early recog-
nition to an implied warranty of seaworthiness which was absolute and
not satisfied by the exercise of due diligence,4 ° the English Courts have
consistently denied the existence of any such warranty or absolute duty
35 Desty, Shipping and Admiralty 139, 161 (1879). Desty recognized the right of the
mariner to recover damages from the shipowner for injuries resulting from "culpable negli-
gence" or "neglect or misconduct of the officers," citing The D.S. Cage, supra note 34, and the
Ben Flint, 3 Fed. Cas. 183, No. 1,299 (D. Wis. 1867). In The D. S. Cage Case, the court
overruled exceptions to a libel alleging the owner's negligent failure to supply the vessel with
proper licensed officers resulting in the boiler explosion causing injuries. This is an "unsea-
worthiness case." The Ben Flint denied a claim for maintenance stating that the vessel's
obligation to furnish maintenance and medical treatment terminated with the end of the
voyage unless the injuries resulted from the negligence of the ship. Desty regarded "main-
tenance and cure" beyond the end of the voyage as damages recoverable only on proof of
fault.
36 Keen v. Overseas Tankship Co., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952), 1952 A.M.C. 241.
37 Laws of Oleron, Art. X, 30 Fed. Cas. 1176; Laws of Wisbuy, Art. XLIX, 30 Fed. Cas.
1193.
38 Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Title First, Art. VIII, 30 Fed. Cas. 1204; Title Second,
Art. II, 30 Fed. Cas. 1205; Title Third, Art. XII, 30 Fed. Cas. 1208.
39 It has been claimed that Article 46 of the Rhodesian Laws provided, "If the ropes break
and the boat goes adrift, with mariners in it, and they perish at sea, the master shall pay
their heirs one full year's wages." The authorities disputing this alleged fragment are dis-
cussed by Judge Peters in Walton v. The Neptune, 29 Fed. Cas. 142, No. 17,135 (D. Pa. 1800).




with respect to seamen. In England, prior to the Merchant Shipping Act
of 1876,-1 the shipowner by special contract or understanding with the
mariners was free to engage them to serve on a known unseaworthy vessel.
Even in the absence of this special understanding, the shipowner was not
chargeable with liability for damages for injuries resulting from unsea-
worthiness caused by the neglect or default of the master or the shipowner's
agents, but only for the unseaworthiness of the vessel caused by his personal
neglect or within his personal knowledge, at the time she broke ground for
the voyage."
American courts, at an early date, also recognized the rights of the mari-
ner to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from unseaworthi-
ness which was attributable to the personal neglect of the shipowner,
but the early cases followed the English rule and denied recovery where
the unseaworthiness was not so chargeable.4 3 American cases coming
somewhat later, however, imposed liability upon the shipowner for the
unseaworthiness of a vessel caused by the "gross, reckless," or "willful"
negligence of the master. These cases were decided by applying the
"vice principal" exception to the "fellow servant" rule, a mistaken anal-
ogy being drawn between this then current common law development
and the admiralty situation. 4 Shortly thereafter, the respondeat superior
41 39 & 40 Vict. c. 80, Sec. 5 (1877).
42 Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854). Parsons regarded this case
as repugnant to the principles expressed by American authorities on the subject. 2 Parsons on
Shipping and Admiralty 78, n. 1. (1869).
43 Halverson v. Nisen, 11 Fed. Cas. 310, No. 5,970 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1876). In this case a
seaman fell to the deck and was seriously injured through the failure of a worn and defective
rope which the mate had negligently incorporated in a triangle rig for hoisting the mariner
above the deck. The court denied liability but stated in regard to the shipowner's obligation
with respect to seaworthiness:
In a certain sense it is as much a part of the implied engagement of the owner with the
mariner that the ship shall, at the commencement of the voyage, be furnished with all
the customary requisites for navigation or, as the term is, shall be seaworthy; as that
the master shall supply the mariners with good and sufficient provisions .... If, by the
owner's negligence, the rigging or apparel are defective, and the seamen sustains an
injury in consequence, the owner would be liable. His liability in this respect does not
differ from that of any other master to a servant in his employment. It is the master's
duty in all cases to use ordinary card and diligence to provide sound and safe materials
for his servants. But he does not warrant them to be so nor insure the servant against
the consequences of their defects. The foundation of his liability is his personal negli-
gence.
Ibid. In Brown v. The D. S. Cage, 4 Fed. Cas. 367, No. 2,002 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1872) the court
said:
It is the duty of the master and owners to employ, so far as they can do so with the
use of ordinary care, servants of sufficient care and skill, to make it probable that they
will not cause injury to each other. ....
Ibid.
44 The NoddIeburn, 28 Fed. 855 (D. Ore. 1886); The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1890). The later decisions of the Supreme Court in The Osceola and Chelantis cases
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doctrine was further extended to impose liability on the shipowner for
injuries resulting from unseaworthiness caused by the negligence of the
vessel's mate."5 Despite such relaxation of the "fellow servant" rule (or,
more properly, extension of respondeat superior to admiralty), the mar-
iner was required in all cases to prove the unseaworthiness was caused by
negligence. But later cases in the Eastern District of New York showed
that "ordinary care" with respect to a vessel required the affirmative exer-
cise of diligence by the owner and master to make the vessel staunch. 6
The earliest mention in American authorities of "unseaworthiness"
appears in cases in which mariners were suing for their wages. In those
cases they were required to allege unseaworthiness of the vessel to excuse
their desertion or misconduct, which, if unexcused, would result in a
forfeiture of all wages. All later references in the American cases to
"seaworthiness" in connection with the rights of mariners in respect to
personal injuries stem back to the language of Judge Peters in The
Cyrus,48 in which he stated as two of the conditions implied in every
mariner's contract:
were premised on a lack of respondeat superior in the maritime law in the relations between
the shipowner and the mariner, and disaffirmed the "vice principal" theory as a basis for
visiting liability on the shipowner. It was therefore probable, until developments subsequent
to The Osceola, that the early American cases would hive been reversed by the Supreme
Court, and the American law held to be the same as the English, i.e., the shipowner' liability
limited to his own personal negligence with respect to the vessel's fabric and gear.
45 In The Frank and Willie, 45 Fed. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1891), the libelant was injured through
the falling of cargo after the mate refused to remedy its dangerous condition. Judge Addison
Brown stated that there was some doubt as to whether mere neglect would visit liability on
the shipowner but in view of the evidence of actual notice permitted recovery to the libelant,
saying:
The principle involved, viz., the duty to provide reasonable security against danger to
life and limb, by at least the usual methods, when these dangers are brought home to the
knowledge of the proper officers is manifestly a general one.
Id. at 496. In The Julia Fowler, 49 Fed. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1892) a mariner recovered damages
from shipowner where defective rope was negligently used by the mate in preparing a triangle
rigging in same factual circumstances in which recovery had been denied in Halverson v.
Nisen, 11 Fed. Cas. 310, No. 5970 (D. Cal. 1876).
46 The Columbia, 124 Fed. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1903) (damages allowed crewman on tug in-
jured by the breaking of a hawser on ground that a mere general examination of the hawser
which "looked fairly well on the outside" was "not the careful inspection required of the
master") ; The Lyndhurst, 149 Fed. 900 (E.D.N.Y. 1906) (where breaking of a runner dropped
a block on a seaman's leg, damages were allowed where it appeared the runner had not been
specially inspected after the vessel went through a heavy storm, the court stating that, "When
a cable breaks in ordinary use, and it appears that there has been no adequate inspection after
it has been subjected to extraordinary strain, the two facts raise a presumption of negligence
that has not in this case been overcome.")
47 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755, No. 3,930 (D. Pa. 1789); Rice v. The Polly and
Kitty, 20 Fed. Cas. 666, No. 11,754 (D. Pa. 1789) ; The Moslem, 17 Fed. Cas. 894, No. 9,875
(S.D.N.Y. 1846).
48 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755, No. 3,930 (D. Pa. 1789).
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First, that at the commencement of the voyage, the ship shall be furnished
with all the necessary and customary requisites for navigation, or, as the
term is, shall be found seaworthy; and, secondly, that the captain shall sup-
ply the mariners with good and sufficient provisions while they are in his
service. . . . When from accidental neglect or otherwise there is a manifest
and visible deficiency, the mariners may reasonably complain and remon-
strate-as in the present case, when the seamen were obliged to go to the
main top to command those ropes which are usually within reach of the
deck.49 (Emphasis supplied)
In the context of the case, Judge Peters' use of the words "or otherwise"
in apposition to the term "accidental neglect" referred to intentional or
willful refusal of the shipowner to outfit the vessel properly, and had no
reference to an absolute undertaking which would include latent defects.
Of more significance, however, is the erroneous reliance which later cases
have placed on The Cyrus and the other early wage cases as authority for
the early recognition of a "warranty of seaworthiness" in personal injury
cases. The Cyrus, and similar cases, did not state a warranty but a true
implied condition. The manifest unseaworthiness of the vessel at the
commencement of the voyage would excuse non-performance by the mar-
iners but did not constitute a basis for damages. The shipowner's bargain
to use reasonable care in "cure" was of a different nature, being a true
warranty, or promise, for breach of which all courts recognized that an
action for damages would lie. Failure of a condition justifies non-per-
formance, unlike breach of a warranty, which, as such, does not excuse
performance but serves as the basis of a claim for damages.50
The classic pronouncement of American maritime law relating to mar-
iners' rights with respect to personal injuries is Mr. Justice Brown's state-
ment of four propositions in The Osceola.5 That case involved a suit
brought by a mariner for injuries sustained as a result of an improvident
49 Id. at 757.
50 Williston on Contracts (Williston and Thompson ed. 1938).
51 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The court stated the following propositions:
1. That the vessel and her owners are liable in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded,
in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at
least so long as the voyage is continued.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an
indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the
ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the
ship. Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211, 13 N.E. 796 (1887).
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as between them-
selves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained through
the negligence of another -member of the crew beyond the expense of his maintenance
and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether the
injuries were received by negligence or accident.
Id. at 175.
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order negligently given by the master. The holding of the case was that
there could be no recovery for such negligence.
Mr. Justice Brown's second proposition in The Osceola states' that
"both by English and American law" the shipowner is liable in damages
for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness, although the seaworthiness of
the vessel was not in issue in the case. The opinion further relates the
American law on the subject to the English practice, stating:
It will be observed in these cases that a departure has been made from the
continental codes in allowing an indemity beyond the expense of mainte-
nance and cure in cases arising from unseaworthiness. This departure orig-
inated in England in the Merchants' Shipping Act of 1876 . . . and in this
country in a general consensus of opinion among the Circuit and District
Courts, that an exception should be made from the general principle before
obtaining, in favor of seamen suffering injury through the unseaworthiness
of the vessel. 52
The English Merchant Shipping Act of 1876, which was re-enacted in
the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894,53 imposed an obligation on the ship-
owner to use all "reasonable means" to make the vessel seaworthy. The
British law for the benefit of the mariner holds the shipowner and his
agents to a standard of due diligence; under the British law as modified
by statute, and as likened to American law by the Supreme Court in The
Osceola, the mariner was and is entitled to recover damages where the
shipowner's neglect results in an unsound vessel and consequent injuries.
It is clear that the liability for "unseaworthiness" which the Supreme
Court mentioned and discussed in The Osceola was a liability premised on
negligence. Scarff v. Metcalf 5 which permitted recovery by a vessel's
mate from the shipowner for aggravation of injuries due to the master's
negligent failure to provide medical treatment is significantly the sole
case cited by Mr. Justice Brown as authority for his second proposition
52 Ibid.
53 39 & 40 Vict. c. 80, § 5 (1876) ; 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60 § 548 (1895):
Sec. 5. In every contract of service, express or implied, between the owner of a ship and
the master or any seaman thereof... there shall be implied, notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, an obligation on the owner of the ship, that the owner of the
ship and the master, and every agent charged with the loading of the ship, or the pre-
paring thereof for sea, or the sending thereof to sea, shall use all reasonable means to
insure the seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage at the time when the voyage com-
mences, and to keep her in a seaworthy condition for the voyage during the same; pro-
vided that nothing in this section shall subject the owner of a ship to any liability by
reason of the ship being sent to sea in an unseaworthy state where, owing to special
circumstances, the so sending thereof to sea, is reasonable and justifiable.
54 107 N.Y. 211, 13 N.E. 796 (1887). The Supreme Court was required to distinguish
between two species of negligence, i.e., negligent failure to provide a seaworthy vessel, for
which negligence the shipowner was liable to injured mariners, and "operating" negligence
of the master, officers or crew in giving orders, performing work or the manner of using
appliances for which the shipowner was not liable to the injured mariner.
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that under American law the vessel is liable to indemnify a mariner injured
in consequence of the vessel's unseaworthiness.
Both before55 and after5" the decision in The Osceola, the federal
courts held that the shipowner was liable to a mariner injured through
the unseaworthiness of the vessel only in those cases where the unsea-
worthiness was a consequence of the owner's failure to exercise due dili-
gence; the shipowner was not liable for injuries resulting from latent
defects or other defects in the ship's structure not avoidable or remediable
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Following the decision in
The Osceola, the federal courts consistently treated that species of negli-
gence which rendered a vessel unseaworthy as an exception to the general
rule that a mariner could not recover from the shipowner for injuries
resulting from negligence. "Unseaworthiness" per se was not sufficient to
visit liability on the shipowner and such liability attached only where the
unseaworthiness was shown to have resulted from a lack of reasonable
care on the part of the shipowner or, following the earlier "vice principal"
cases, the master or the officers.
57
The shipowner's liability in the American courts, as in the English, was
limited to cases in which he had failed to use reasonable care to provide
proper appliances, and liability did not attach where mariners' injuries
resulted from the failure of those aboard the vessel to make proper use of
such appliances.58 The federal courts, having extended the doctrine of
respondeat superior to charge the shipowner with the defaults of the
vessel's master or mate with respect to seaworthiness were soon phrasing
the shipowner's obligation in terms of a "non-delegable duty" to use due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy at commencement of the voyage
55 The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. 477 (S.I). Ala. 1887); The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 Fed.
685 (D. Conn. 1899).
56 The Henry B. Fiske, 141 Fed. 188 (D. Mass. 1905). The Court said:
As regards the crew employed on board a vessel, there is no warranty on her part that
none of her fittings or appliances shall at any time give way, to their injury. Liability
on her part, in a case of an accident of this kind, is incurred only when those who rep-
resent her have failed to exercise reasonable care to make the fitting or appliance safe,
and arises only out of such defects as reasonable care on their part would have discov-
ered and remedied.
Id. at 190. The case also discusses The Osceola with respect to maintenance. Cf. Burton v.
Greig, 271 Fed. 271 (5th Cir. 1921); Smith, "Liability for Injuries to Seaman," 19 Harv. L.
Rev. 418 (1906).
57 Storgard v. France & Canada S.S. Co., 263 Fed. 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1920) ("If the bolt
was worn and defective, and the shipowners knew or ought to have known that fact, it makes
no difference whether they as reasonable men would not have apprehended the particular
accident which actually did happen."); The Colusa, 248 Fed. 21, 24 (9th Cir. 1918) ("The
turnbuckle so used was defective, and known by the chief officer to be defective. .. ").
58 Hedley v. The Pinkney & Sons S.S. Co. Ltd. (C.A. 1891) VII Asp. Mar. Cas. 135 (CA.
1891), aff'd., VII. Asp. Mar. Cas. 483 (H.L.).
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for the benefit of the mariner.59 The change in phrasing is attributable
to the Harter Act adopted in 1893 to regulate the shipowner's liability to
cargo.
6 0
The first statement of the shipowner's obligation as an "absolute duty"
to furnish a seaworthy ship without regard to negligence appears in Mr.
Justice McReynolds' opinion in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,61 de-
cided in 1922. In this case the jury found that the mariner was entitled
to damages for injuries received through the negligence of the shipowner
in permitting the vessel to sail with gasoline in a kerosene can. An explo-
sion occurred when the seaman, thinking the can contained kerosene, used
the gasoline to start a fire. The Supreme Court of Washington, following
the Osceola case, affirmed a recovery by the seaman on the ground that
the shipowner's negligence had caused an unseaworthy condition, for the
consequences of which the seaman could recover damages.6" Having first
determined that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding
of negligence on the part of the shipowner, the Washington Court then
considered as a separate question whether the ,presence of gasoline in a
kerosene can was the type of impropriety in the vessel's equipment which
would constitute "unseaworthiness." Solely in its exploration of this sec-
ond question, the court quoted from Carver on Carriage of Goods by
Sea63 with respect to the definition of "unseaworthiness," and said that
gasoline in a kerosene can was "unseaworthiness."
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court,
stated:
We think the trial court might have told the jury that, without regard to
negligence, the vessel was unseaworthy when she left the dock . . . and
that, if thus unseaworthy, and one of the crew received damage as a direct
result thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages.64
This was an entirely unnecessary dictum in view of the shipowner's estab-
lished negligence, and it apparently failed also to appreciate the limited
purpose for which the Washington State Court had made reference to "sea-
worthiness" as defined in Carver's Carriage of Goods by Sea. In support
of his statement, which was revolutionary in its language and unqualified
in its apparent scope, Mr. Justice McReynolds cited three cargo cases65
59 Globe S.S. Co. v. Moss, 245 Fed. 54 (6th Cir. 1917).
60 27 Stat. 445 et seq. (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 190-196 (1946).
61 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
62 Sandanger v. Carlisle Packing Co., 112 Wash. 480, 192 Pac. 1005 (1920).
63 Id. at 490.
64 259 U.S. at 259.
65 The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462 (1898) (as to cargo, a vessel is seaworthy when she leaves port
if proper iron covers for the portholes are provided and readily accessible, even though not
actually in place); The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903) (as to cargo, the shipowner's failure
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and one case in which a seaman recovered damages for injuries resulting
from the shipowner's negligent failure to provide a seaworthy vessel.66
In view of Mr. Justice McReynolds' inadvertent likening of the law of
"seaworthiness" with respect to seamen to the doctrine of "seaworthi-
ness" in the law of carriage of goods, the radically different bases of the
two doctrines should be noted. "Seaworthiness" is a useful and much
used concept in the law of carriage of goods by sea and marine insurance
as well as in mariners' rights; but until Mr. Justice McReynolds' dictum,
the shipowner's obligations in the three branches of maritime law had
never been regarded as identical. The shipowner's implied "warranty" of
seaworthiness to cargo is derived from the absolute obligation imposed
on common carriers by English common law to insure the safe delivery of
merchandise entrusted to them, excepting only "acts of God, and of the
enemies of the King." 67 In the absence of express contract the shipowner
was liable for loss or damage to the cargo arising from unseaworthiness at
the commencement of the voyage in the same way that he was liable for
loss or damage from any other cause regardless of his due diligence with
the sole exceptions of "acts of God and enemies of the King." The "im-
plied warranty of seaworthiness" in a voyage policy of marine insurance,
although somewhat different in its effect, has been likened by some writers
to the shipowner's "warranty" of seaworthiness of cargo."' The "implied
warranty of seaworthiness" in the law of marine insurance derives from
the intent of the parties to the policy of insurance, under which the under-
writers agreed to pay the shipowner if his vessel were lost through the
"perils of the sea" or other enumerated causes, but which protected the
underwriter from liability for losses which might result from perils for
which the underwriter did not accept responsibility. The Courts held that
a "seaworthy vessel" was a condition precedent to the attachment of the
risk of the policy as the underwriters could not be deemed to contemplate
to furnish refrigerating apparatus in good order and repair at the commencement of the
voyage is a breach of his obligation to furnish a seaworthy vessel); The Caledonia, 157 U.S.
124 (1895) (in absence of express contract, every contract for the carriage of goods by sea
contains an implied warranty that the vessel will in fact be seaworthy, which is not satisfied
by the mere exercise of due diligence).
66 Thompson Towing & Wrecking Assn. v. McGregor, 207 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1913). The
court there said:
The vessel as an entirety must be seaworthy; and the owners' duty in this behalf is
positive and non-assignable.... This rule does not differ in principle from the rule
which holds a master liable in damages for neglect of his positive duty to his injured
servant, no matter whether such injury is due in part to neglect of fellow servants or not.
Id. at 211, 212.
67 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
68 I Parsons on Shipping 285, n. (1869).
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accepting the risk of loss of "an unseaworthy vessel" through the opera-
tion of perils of the sea. 9
The use and development of the term "implied warranty of seaworthi-
ness" in the law of sea carriage of goods and of marine insurance was
useful and harmless as a convenient means of expressing, for the one, a
cause of loss which was not within the very limited exemptions from
liability permitted the common carrier, and, for the other, a risk of loss
which the underwriter was unwilling to assume. The use of the term
"implied warranty of seaworthiness" in reference to mariners' personal
injuries served no such convenient purpose, and was inaccurate, for the
shipowner was under no absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel
for the seaman, but was liable to the seaman only for that limited species
of negligence which resulted in an unseaworthy vessel.70
The federal courts for a decade and a half appear to have recognized
Mr. Justice McReynolds' dictum in the Sandanger case as a mere inad-
vertence. Although a number of passing incidental references were made
to the statement by the courts, including the Supreme Court,71 in no case
was the rule stated as a ground of decision. In those cases in which it was
of importance to state the proper basis of the shipowner's liability for
injuries resulting from unseaworthiness, the liability was stated accurately
by the Supreme Court as being grounded in negligence.72
69 I Parsons on Marine Insurance 370, n.1 (1868).
70 Smith, supra note 56, at 425 states:
It is for negligence alone that ship and owners are held. With respect to injuries resulting
to seamen from latent defects not discoverable by the exercise of due care, there is no
liability.
71 Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 36 (1926), 1926 A.M.C. 679, 681 ("The present suit
is not brought merely to enforce the liability of the owner of the vessel to indemnity for
injuries caused by a defective appliance without regard to negligence .... "); Sabine Towing
Co. Inc. v. Brennan, 72 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1934), 1934 AM.C. 1122, 1129 ("This duty,
as to injuries, for which the general maritime law provides recovery, is absolute. Its breach
without regard to negligence makes the owner liable for such losses.") The quotation from
the Sabine Towing Co. case is dictum, the court having found the shipowner guilty of action-
able negligence in knowingly sending an unstable vessel to sea. The Fifth Circuit recognized
its statement in the Sabine Towing Co. case as inadvertent dictum which it repudiated in a
later case. Cf. The Tawmie, 80 F.2d 792, 793 (6th Cir. 1936), 1936 A.M.C. 110, 111 ("A
shipowner is not an insurer of the safety of his seamen, nor is the owner liable for injuries
caused by the breaking of apparatus if due care was used in furnishing the appliance and
keeping it in safe condition and repair. The burden of establishing negligence by a fair
preponderance of the evidence rests upon libelant.")
72 Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), 1927 A.M.C. 946, a subsequent
suit under the Jones Act alleging the negligent use of appliances by fellow servants was barred
as res adjudicata by dismissal of a prior libel under the general maritime law alleging unsea-
worthiness of the appliances. The court said, at 321, 1927 A.M.C. at 950, "The mere multipli-
cation of grounds of negligence alleged as causing the same injury does not result in multi-
plying the causes of action." See Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928),
1928 A.M.C. 1932, where the court said:
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The first federal case in which Mr. Justice McReynolds' dictum was
applied deliberately as the basis of decision was The H. A. Scandrett.73
The jury, in answer to specific interrogatories, stated that a latent defect
in a door lock contributed to the accident which resulted when a door
knob pulled loose, throwing the seaman backwards. Judge Augustus N.
Hand, in affirming the judgment, stated, "In such a case the liability for
any injuries arising out of the neglect to supply a seaworthy vessel is not
dependent on the exercise of reasonable care but is absolute." In stating
this proposition, which is probably dictum, as a basis of decision, he quite
frankly revealed that he regarded his statement of the proposition of
absolute liability as a determination based on "policy" considerations and
a desirable bit of judicial legislation.74
In Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.,75 the Supreme Court, in an extended
dictum, phrased the shipowner's obligation to his mariners in terms of a
"warranty of seaworthiness" which was said to be both absolute and
continuing. The only question before the court was whether the ship-
owner was liable for injuries sustained by a mariner in the fall of a defec-
tive staging in which the mate and boatswain had negligently incorporated
patently defective rope. The shipowner's defense was that the injuries
The right to recover compensatory damages under the new rule for injuries caused by
negligence is, however, an alternative of the right to recover indemnity under the old
rules on the ground that the injuries were occasioned by unseaworthiness; and it is
between these two inconsistent remedies for an injury, both grounded on tort, that we
think an election is to be made under the maritime law as modified by the statute.
Unseaworthiness, as is well understood, embraces certain species of negligence; while the
statute [The Jones Act] includes several additional species not embraced in that term.
Id. at 138, 1928 A.M.C. at 1937. Christopher v. Grueby, 40 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1930), 1930
A.M.C. 989, 996 ("The duty of shipowners to their seamen to see that their ship is seaworthy
and their equipment in safe condition for use when she starts on a voyage is a personal one,
responsibility for which they cannot escape by delegating its performance to another. In this
respect, it is like the common law duty of a master to provide his servant a suitable place
in which to work.") In The Elk, 1938 A.M.C. 714 (D. Mass. 1938), the cases on the subject
are fully reviewed, and the case suggests a distinction between the term "operating" negli-
gence and negligence causing unseaworthiness.
73 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937), 1937 A.M.C. 326.
74 The court said:
A ship is an instrumentality full of internal hazards aggravated, if not created, by the
uses to which she is put. It seems to us that everything is to be said for holding her
absolutely liable to her crew for injuries arising from defects in her hull and equipment.
The liability can be covered by insurance and is better treated as an expense of the
business than one left to an uncertain determination of courts in actions to recover for
negligence.
Id. at 711, 1937 A.M.C. at 331. Judge Augustus N. Hand's statement of the proposition of
absolute liability in this case may be viewed as dictum, and unnecessary'to support his
affirmance of the judgment. The jury had specifically found that the door, in addition to the
latent defects in the lock, had patent defects which a competent inspection would have dis-
ciosed and which proximately contributed to the injury, and accordingly reduced the gross
award on the basis of the seaman's contributory negligence.
75 321 U.S. 96 (1944), 1944 A.M.C. 1, reversing 135 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1943).
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on these facts resulted from the negligence of the mate as a fellow servant
rather than from "'unseaworthiness."
The odd manner in which issue was joined in the Mahnich case ac-
counts in major part for the sweeping nature of the resulting dictum.
The shipowner made only passing reference to the nature of a shipowner's
obligation with respect to seaworthiness (making no objection to the trial
court's finding that the mate negligently failed to observe a patent defect
in the rope). The shipowner's prime argument was that the condition did
not constitute unseaworthiness, and that, in any event, the accident was
caused by the operating negligence of the mate rather than unseaworthi-
ness.70 As a result of the manner in which the case arose, there was no
attempt by the shipowner to demonstrate that liability for unseaworthi-
ness is predicated on negligence, and Mr. Justice Stone assumed the con-
trary proposition in his dictum.
The actual holding of the Supreme Court in the Mahnich case is that
the negligence of the mate in furnishing or fabricating a defective appli-
ance visits liability upon the shipowner as for unseaworthiness. This is
unquestionably consonant with the doctrine of "seaworthiness" with re-
spect to mariners which was considered and stated by the Supreme Court
in The Osceola, and shows Supreme Court approval of the lower courts'
earlier extension of respondeat superior in "unseaworthiness" cases to in-
clude the defaults of the master and the mate. The facts in the Mahnich
case were virtually identical with those in The Julia Fowler" which was
discussed and apparently approved in The Osceola. But the dictum in the
Mahnich case includes the startling misstatement that the "later cases"
have followed "the ruling of The Osceola . . . that the exercise of due
diligence does not relieve the owner of his obligation to the seaman to
furnish adequate appliances." 78 Of the six cases cited, only the Sandanger
and H. A. Scandrett cases lend verisimilitude to the stated proposition.7"
76 In these contentions the shipowner relied on Mr. Justice McReynolds' statement in
Plamals v. The Pinar del Rio, 27T U.S. 151 (1938), 1928 A.M.C. 932 which involved virtually
identical facts. In that case, Mr. Justice McReynolds stated that the injury resulted from the
negligence of the mate and that the vessel was not unseaworthy. He further held that a
British seaman has no right in rem against a British vessel under the Jones Act. Mr. Justice
McReynolds' statement in the Pinar del Rio, supra, improperly described as dictum, was a
direct application of the English rule that respondeat superior does not operate to charge the
shipowner with the defaults of the master or mate with respect to seaworthiness. Mr. justice
Stone, in the Mahnich case, supra note 75, refused to follow this holding.
77 49 Fed. 277 (S3).N.Y. 1892).
78 321 U.S. at 100, 1944 A.M.C. at 5.
79 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (the liability for "unseaworthiness" mentioned in the
dictum in this case was predicated on negligence); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259
U.S. 255, 259 (1922) (dictum); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936) (assumption of
the risk is not a defense in a Jones Act suit for negligent failure to furnish safe appliances) ;
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Mr. Justice Stone in the Mahnich case, like Mr. Justice McReynolds
in the Sandanger case, erroneously assumed that the shipowner's obliga-
tion to mariners, like his obligation to cargo, was predicated on warranty,
and was absolute.80 It was Mr. Justice Stone's assumption that ship-
owners insure the soundness of their vessels to all the world until relieved
by statute of the insurer's obligation a to a particular group. This was
not the law in general, and specifically was not the law with respect to
mariners; no authority was cited in support of the proposition for there
was none.
To the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1945 fell the distinc-
tion of first stating, as a doctrine necessary to support its decree, the
proposition that the shipowner's obligation to furnish a seaworthy vessel
is absolute and not satisfied by due diligence. This leading case, Sieracki
v. Seas Shipping Co.,"' in its progress through the district court, the
circuit court, and later the Supreme Court,"2 demonstrates in a particu-
laxly dramatic manner the profound part which is played in the develop-
ment of the law by prior dicta and the inadvertences and accidents in
emphasis which result from the alignment of the parties in the individual
case. Sieracki, not a mariner but a longshoreman, was injured when the
shackle supporting a ten-ton cargo boom on the S.S. Robin. Sherwood
failed. He sued the shipowner, the shipowner impleaded the shipbuilder
and the supplier -of the shackle, and the plaintiff thereafter proceeded
against all three. The defect was latent, and not discernible either visually
or by any other test which shipowners customarily or reasonably give
vessel's equipment. The district court, however, held that the ship-
builder and the supplier of the shackle were held to a high standard of
care and in the absence of any proof of the tests actually performed by
them on the shackle they were liable to plaintiff under the doctrine of
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co."5
Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936) (assumption of the risk is not a defense to a Jones
Act suit for injuries resulting from negligently piled luniber); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 428 (1939) (assumption of the risk is no defense to a Jones Act suit for
negligent failure to furnish a safe appliance) ; The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937
(probably dictum but at best a bit of judicial legislation); The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S.
.199 (1849) (a cargo damage case affirming the usual rule that in the absence of contract to
the contrary the shipowner owes to cargo an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel).
80 It required the Harter Act to relax the exacting obligation to cargo of the owner's
warranty of seaworthiness of ship and tackle. That relaxation has not been extended,
either by statute or by decision, to the like obligation of the owner to the seamen. The
defense of the fellow servant rule to suits in admiralty for ne'gligence, a defense pre-
cluded by the Jones Act, has never avowedly been deemed applicable to the owner's
stricter obligation to the seaman of the warranty of seaworthiness.
321 U.S. at 101, 1944 A.M.C. at 5.
81 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), 1945 A.M.C. 407, reversing 57 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
82 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
83 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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With respect to the shipowner, tlhe district court in the Sieracki case
assumed casually and in passing that the shipowner's obligation of sea-
worthiness was absolute as to a seaman, 4 citing only The Osceola, but
dismissed the shipowner on its holding that Mr. Sieracki was not a "sea-
man" and as a longshoreman was entitled only to the exercise of reason-
able care on the part of the shipowner. On the appeal to the Third Circuit,
the major contest was restricted to Sieracki's claim that he was a "sea-
man." He prevailed in this contention. The shipowner, for strategic
purposes, found it desirable to concede that mariners are entitled to a
"warranty of a seaworthiness" as a matter of contract, but urged that
such "warranty" does not extend to a longshoreman employee of an inde-
pendent stevedore contractor, since there is no privity of contract between
such longshoremen and the shipowner.8 5
It appears clearly from the opinions that in both the district court
and the court of appeals the nature of the shipowner's obligation to a
"mariner" with respect to seaworthiness was assumed rather than decided
and was not the point on which the case was fought. In the Supreme
Court the major contest again centered on the shipowner's contention
that Sieracki as a "longshoreman" was not a "seaman" and therefore not
entitled to the seamen's "warranty of seaworthiness." It appears that the
shipowner in the Supreme Court conceded that the shipowner's obligation
to a mariner with respect to seaworthiness was absolute."6 In view of the
apparent concession of the parties before it on the point, the Supreme
Court gave only cursory consideration to the question of the extent and
nature of the shipowner's obligation to mariners. In support of its asser-
84 Judge Kirkpatrick said:
The plaintiff asks the court to find that the accident occurred by reason of unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel and I make that finding, but his contention that this fact alone
entitles him to recover against the owner cannot be sustained. If he were a seaman in
the employ of a vessel he would, of course, be entitled to a verdict on that showing
alone. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158. But he is not a seaman nor a member of the crew
of the vessel.
Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724 at 727 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
85 We think it is undisputed that if the falling boom had hit one of the sailors the
injured seaman could have recovered from the ship's owner, or the ship, on the basis of
breach of warranty of seaworthiness, that warranty not being dependent upon a showing
of negligence at all. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); the H. A.
Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937). Is the longshoreman entitled to the same protec-
tion? It is clear that so far as the "warranty" depends upon contract, plaintiff was not
a party to a contract with the shipowner.
Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 at 101 (3d Cir. 1945).
86 There could be no question of petitioner's liability for respondent's injuries, incurred
as they were here, if he had been in petitioner's employ rather than hired by the stevedor-
ing company. That an owner is liable to indemnify a seaman for an injury caused by
the unseaworthiness of a vessel or its appurtenant appliances and equipment has been
settled law in this country ever since the Osceola, 189 U.S. 158; Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, and authorities cited.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 at 90 (1946).
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tion that the shipowner's obligation to seamen was absolute in nature, the
Supreme Court, in addition to its own dicta in the Osceola and Mahrnch
cases, cited only three inapplicable cases.8 7
In his opinion in the Sieracki case, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated that
the origin of the doctrine of the shipowner's absolute obligation to furnish
a seaworthy vessel to mariners was perhaps unascertainable, failing to
recognize that the doctrine had its origin in Mr. Justice McReynolds'
misconception of the dictum in The Osceola, which he stated in his opinion
in the Sandanger case, and which was later restated through inadvertence
in Mr. Justice Stone's dictum in the Maknich case. Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge's discussion of the rights of mariners in the Sieracki case was not an
analysis of the rights of mariners as such, but rather a demonstration of
his view that the sociological, economic, and humanitarian incidents and
results of a doctrine of absolute liability justify the extension of such a
doctrine to a class of other than mariners."8
Since the Sieracki case, the courts have uniformly, and without further
analysis, assumed that the shipowner has an absolute, continuing, non-
delegable obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel for the mariners. The
later cases have been concerned with determining the categories and items
of the vessel's economy which the shipowner's assumed "warranty" of
fitness encompasses. Recent cases have held the vessel to be unseaworthy
for having aboard a mariner with a latent emotional instability which
resulted in his assaulting a fellow crew member with a meat cleaver 9
although the vessel is not unseaworthy where the latent emotional insta-
bility results only in an assault with fists.9"
In the Mahnick and Sieracki cases the Supreme Court used the terms
87 Id. at 90. The court cited the Edith Goden, 23 Fed. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (shipowner's
negligent furnishing of a derrick which was inadequate for the intended use; Judge Addison
Brown applied the municipal law, which he stated required the shipowner "to exercise due
care in providing machinery adequate and proper for the use to which it was to be applied,
and to maintain it in like condition"); Win. Johnson & Co. v. Johansen, 86 Fed. 886 (5th
Cir. 1898) (rope and tackle unsafe, improper and inadequate for intended use negligently
supplied by master); The Waco, 3 F.2d 476 (E.D. Pa. 1925) (shipowner's negligent failure
to provide a proper platform for cleaning boiler tubes "I am of the opinion therefore that
the accident was caused partly by the negligence of the owner and partly by the negligence
of the libelant.")
88 These ... have been thought to justify and to require putting their burden, insofar
as it is measurable in money, upon the owner, regardless of his fault. Those risks are
avoidable by the owner to the extent that they may result from negligence. And beyond
this he is in position, as the worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping com-
munity which receives the service and should bear its costs.... The liability is neither
limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character.... It is a form of
absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy.
328 U.S. at 93.
89 Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corporation, 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952), 1952 A.M.C. 241.
90 Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953), 1953 A.M.C. 1010.
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"absolute, continuing" and "non-delegable" in expressing its view of the
nature of the shipowner's obligation with respect to seaworthiness. In
affirming without opinion the decision of the Ninth Circuit in the very
recent Petterson9" case, the majority of the Supreme Court has extended to
a literal and logical extreme the definitions of the nature of the shipowner's
obligation appearing in its prior dicta. The Ninth Circuit had reversed the
District Court and imposed liability on the shipowner for breach of an as-
sumed absolute, continuing and non-delegable obligation to provide a sea-
worthy vessel to longshoremen, where a block which failed in ordinary use
was owned and used exclusively by the independent stevedore contractor.
The offending block had been lost overboard in the accident and the only
evidence of its defective condition was the inference which might be drawn
from its failure during ordinary use. Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the
Supreme Court majority (despite a vigorous dissent by Justices Burton,
Frankfurter and Jackson) regarded the independent stevedore contractor's
assumed ownership and exclusive control of the device as sufficient to re-
lieve the shipowner of absolute liability for injuries caused to a longshore-
man through failure of the device. The Petterson case, like the Sieracki
case, although concerning a longshoreman, effectively, extends the doctrine
of seaworthiness with respect to seamen by reason of the assimilation of
longshoremen to seamen first announced in the Sieracki case. The Ninth
Circuit in its opinion and the dissent in the Supreme Court recognized that
the holding in the Petterson case is contrary to the view obtaining in the
Second and Third Circuits9 2 where the shipowner's obligation is regarded
as terminating upon the delivery of an appliance in good order into the
exclusive control of the independent stevedore contractor.
To the extent that the Supreme Court's present doctrine of "insured
seaworthiness" is based on anything other than its failure properly to
limit its own prior dicta, it necessarily represents a frank excursion into
legislation. The Supreme Court has frequently expressed its view that
91 Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1405, cert.
granted, 346 U.S. 914 (1953), aff'd mem. sub nom. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc. v. Petterson, 74 Sup.
Ct.601 (1954).
92 Mollica v. Compania Sud-America, 202 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1953), 1953 A.M.C. 299;
Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Lines, 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1953), 1953 A.M.C. 1315;
Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1945), 1945 A.M.C. 1387; Lauro v. United States,
162 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1947), 1947 A.M.C. 888. In his concurring opinion in the Lauro case,
supra, Judge Learned Hand declined to concede that the shipowner's liability would depend
upon whether the oil upon which the decedent had slipped had been placed there before or
after the stevedore entered upon the ship, but rested his concurrence on his view that the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Sieracki case and its assimilation of longshoremen to




maritime law is subject to development and change under its guidance9"
except in those cases where the Court believes the legislative function can
be more effectively performed by the legislative branch. 4 Disregarding
the question which history raises concerning the suitability of the judicial
process for performance of the legislative function,95 the substantially
important question remains whether the Supreme Court regards its quasi
legislative determinations in the maritime field as within the doctrine of
stare decisis or whether they are, like true legislative determinations, sub-
ject to continuing review, modification, reopening, amendment and repeal.
Mariners, like shipowners, longshoremen, and stevedore contractors,
have little interest in refinements of legal theory or in the origins of legal
doctrines. Injuries to mariners occur only infrequently through latent
defects and the phrasing by the Supreme Court of the doctrine of "sea-
worthiness" in terms of absolute liability adds relatively few cases to
those for which the shipowner would be liable on accepted theories of
negligence. The practical and economic importance to mariners or
shipowners of phrasing the doctrine in terms of absolute liability is that
recovery by the injured mariners in the usual case is practically assured.
The mariner is permitted, under the doctrine, in virtually every case, to
obtain an instruction to the jury that the shipowner is liable "without
fault" if the vessel is found to be "unseaworthy," as well as the usual
instructions relating to liability for negligence. Thus, the presentation
and discussion of the doctrine of absolute liability operates in the mari-
ner's favor,96 even in cases which are primarily based on negligence.
Although there is some disagreement among the lower courts, the numeri-
93 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ("Exercising its traditional discre-
tion, admiralty has developed and now follows its own fairer and more flexible rule .... ") ;
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn, 342 U.S. 282 (1942), 1952 AM.C. 1. See also Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
94 A legislative inquiry might show that neither carriers, shippers, employees, nor
casualty insurance companies desire such a change to be made. The record before us
is silent as to the wishes of employees, carriers, and shippers....
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn, 342 U.S. 282 at 286 (1953).
95 For example, note the promptness with which the Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 et seq., 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1946), was enacted
following the decision of the Supreme Court in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
272 U.S. 50 (1926) in which the Supreme Court gave longshoremen the rights of seamen
under the Jones Act despite the protests of all interested groups that longshoremen were
not seamen: Furuseth, "Harbor Workers are not Seamen," 11 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 139 (1921) ;
T. V. O'Connor, President International Longshoremen's Association (1921): "If the justices
of the Supreme Court had thoroughly understood the difference between longshoremen and
ship's crews, I feel certain that they would never have included both in the same class."
[Referring to the decisions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), and
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), 11 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 144.]
96 Hollis v. Grace Line, 1952 A.M.C. 1609 (N.D.Cal. 1952).
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cal majority of recent decisions permit the mariner to present his case to
the jury on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. 7
Justices Jackson, Reed and Burton, in the dissenting opinion in the
Hawn case,1 recognize the practical advantage which accrues to a plaintiff
in a personal injury action through the securing of jury instructions refer-
ring to absolute liability. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring
opinion, noted specifically that in the absence of timely objection to
trial by jury, the question was not presented as to whether the plaintiff
was entitled to a jury trial in a suit based on both "maritime and common
law" causes of action.
If the Supreme Court holds to its present view that the shipowner's
"seaworthiness" obligation is absolute, regardless of negligence, the ques-
tion remains whether the mariner, and those harbor workers assimilated
to mariners, are required to elect between a claim of "unseaworthiness"
and a claim of "operating negligence" before the case is submitted to the
trier of fact.
HARBOR WORKER VS. EMPLOYER
Early American cases indicated doubt as to whether the Admiralty
Court had jurisdiction of torts occurring aboard vessels while in a har-
bor99 and the contention that they did not was made, although unsuccess-
fully, as recently as 1882.10 Until the Federal courts determined that
the services performed by a longshoreman were maritime in nature, 10 1
longshoremen injured in their work, apparently in part because of doubt
as to admiralty jurisdiction, pursued their personal injury claims against
their employers in the State courts and in the Federal courts on the law
side.
97 Thomsen v. The Dorene B., 91 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.Cal. 1950), 1950 A.M.C. 1412;
German v. Carnegie Illinois Steel Co., 156 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1926), 1946 A.M.C. 1950; Pacific
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); Spangler v. Matson Navigation Co., 1950 A.M.C.
409 (Wash. 1950).
The right to recover compensatory damages under the new rule for injuries caused by
negligence is, however, an alternative of the right to recover indemnity under the old
rules on the ground that the injuries were occasioned by unseaworthiness; and it is
between these two inconsistent remedies for an injury, both grounded on tort, that we
think an election is to be made under the maritime law as modified by the statute.
Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 at 138 (1928).
98 346 U.S. 406, 419 (1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1.
99 Borden v. Hierne, 3 Fed. Cas. 897, No. 1,655 (SLD.N.Y. 1832).
100 Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882). In view of the modern developments, it is
surprising to note that the doubts as to the scope of the admiralty jurisdiction should have
continued so long in the face of judge Story's excellent dissertations in De Lovio v. Boit, 7
Fed. Cas. 418, No. 3,776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) ; Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641
(C.C.D. Mass. 1832).
101 George T. Kemp, 10 Fed. Cas. 227 No. 5,341 (D. Mass. 1876) (stevedore claiming mari-
time Hen).
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The remedies which the longshoremen and other harbor workers pur-
sued against their employers for shipboard injuries in the common law
courts, and which were granted them by the courts, were the same com-
mon law remedies and rights of recovery which the common law, in its
then period of development, made available to shoreside workers gener-
ally. When the harbor workers' rights to resort to the admiralty court for
personal injuries was established,0 s the admiralty courts followed the
common law courts in granting or withholding recovery on the same prin-
ciples on which the common law courts allowed or denied recovery to
purely shoreside employees against shoreside employers. Thus the ad-
miralty court,1 °3 like the common law court,'0 4 judged the employer's
liability to his employee in terms of reasonable care to provide a safe
place to work, modified by the doctrine of assumption of the risk with its
numerous refinements. It granted recovery for the negligence of the em-
ployer, but denied it for that of a fellow servant, unless a "vice principal"
and subjected the employer's liability to other refinements developed by
the common law, including the doctrine of "borrowed servant." Following
the trend of the times, and New York's adoption of a Workmen's Compen-
sation Act in 1910, the State courts and State administrative bodies ex-
tended the benefits available under the State Workmen's Compensation
Acts to harbor workers injured aboard ship. All interested groups ap-
102 Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882) (business invitee seeking to inquire about
purchase of cotton injured through collapse of negligently stowed cargo; petitioner-respondent
Leathers was captain of the Natchez defeated by the Robert E. Lee in the historic 1870 river
race from New Orleans to St. Louis.)
103 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914) (failure of employer to use
proper diligence to provide a safe place of work) ; The Elton, 142 Fed. 367 (3d Cir. 1906)
(holding that the vessel's crew member winch driver, through whose negligence the long-
shoreman employee of an independent stevedore contractor was injured, was a fellow servant
of the longshoreman barring recovery); Cornec v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 48 F.2d 497 (4th
Cir. 1931) (concerning an explosion which occurred prior to the enactment of the Federal
Longshoremen's Act holding that the employer had failed to exercise proper diligence to
furnish a safe place to work and that employees had not assumed risk as they had no notice
or knowledge of the hazard of explosion). But note that the admiralty court regarded the
effect of contributory negligence as a matter of procedure determined by the choice of forum:
The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Penn. R.R., 48 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1931) 1931 A.M.C.
1800.
104 Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909) (action by longshoreman employee
of independent stevedore contractor against shipowner but discussing principles applicable
to recovery against employer); The Hoquiam, 253 Fed. 627 (9th Cir. 1918) (holding the
Jones Act not applicable to longshoremen employed by the vessel and discussing theories
applying to longshoremen endeavoring to recover from shipowner employer) ; Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, 255 Fed. 817 (9th Cir. 1919) ; same case, 260 Fed. 839 (9th Cir. 1919) (discus-
sing theories applicable to longshoremen endeavoring to recover from his shipowner employer),
reversed on other grounds, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
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peared content with this arrangement"0 5 (with the sole exception of the
employer, who was faced in the individual case with an employee's injury
occasioned by the employee's own fault.) As authority for the legal pro-
priety of such acts as applied to shipboard injuries, the states could look
to decisions of the Supreme Court holding state death acts available for
deaths occurring on navigable waters within a state'0 6 and even to deaths
occurring on the high seas. 107
This relatively happy adjustment of the matter was terminated in 1917
with the Supreme Court's holding in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
0 8
that State compensation acts, if permitted to stand, would work material
prejudice to the "harmony and uniformity" of the general maritime law
and therefore must fall. Congress promptly attempted to cure the diffi-
culty resulting from this decision by amending the "saving to suitors'
clause" of the Judiciary Code in order additionally to save to "claimants
the rights and remedies under the Workman's Compensation Law of any
state." 109 The Supreme Court rejected Congress' solution as soon as the
question was presented in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart.110 Congress
again attempted to cure the resulting problem by further amending the
"saving to suitors' clause" -11 in the mistaken belief that the Supreme
Court's objection to its prior endeavor was directed to the wording, which
was sufficiently broad, if read literally, to encompass crew members.
Again the Supreme Court held it beyond Congress' power to place har-
bor workers on a parity with their neighbors in their respective com-
munities." 2
In 1926, apparently having abandoned hope of Congress acting on its
prior broad hints to adopt a Federal Workmen's Compensation Act, and
possibly in part as a concession to Justices Holmes and Brandeis, whose
dissents in the Jensen line of cases were vehement, the Supreme Court in
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty"' effectively adopted its own
Federal Longshoremen's Act by extending the Jones Act to the harbor
105 For presentation of the views of the harbor workers' and seafarers' unions and State
administrators, see 11 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 133 et seq. (1921).
106 Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
107 The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (holding Delaware Death Act properly applicable
to death on high seas resulting from collision between two vessels, both of which were owned
by Delaware corporations.)
108 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
109 40 Stat. 395 (1917).
110 253 U.S. 1949 (1920).
111 42 Stat. 634 (1922).
112 Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), 1924 A.M.C. 403. For an excellent
discussion of the legislative and judicial vicissitudes attending the application of workmen's
compensation legislation to harbor workers, see, Robinson, Admiralty 93 et seq. (1939).
13 272 U.S. 50 (1926), 1926 A.M.C. 1638.
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worker employees of independent contractors. 114 Neither Congress nor
the concerned groups were satisfied with the Supreme Court's legisla-
tive product and, during the next year, the Federal Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act of 1927 115 was adopted. This Act, with rela-
tively minor procedural amendments and a few significant substantive
changes,"' today furnishes the harbor worker's exclusive remedy against
his employer for personal injury incurred on shipboard.
It is at least questionable whether the Supreme Court in forcing the
adoption of the Longshoremen's Act achieved a meaningful "uniformity."
As the law now stands, the individual harbor worker's compensation
varies by the accidental circumstance of whether he is injured on ship-
board or on the dock, and the compensation of the harbor worker injured
on shipboard is greater or smaller than that of his shoreside, next-door
neighbor dependent upon the equally accidental circumstance of whether
the State or the Federal Act provides the larger benefit. Additionally,
there is the ever-present hazard that the harbor worker in the multitude
of close factual situations may "zig" when he should "zag," and by his
initial choice of the wrong remedy, end with no remedy."'
The "uniformity" which the Jensen line of cases imposed on harbor
workers' recoveries against their employers for injuries sustained aboard
ship was solely a "uniformity," on a national scale, in transactions arising
in individual localities throughout the country, and involving relations
between a local shoreside worker and his local shoreside employer, except
in those cases where the harbor worker was employed directly by the ship-
owner. The ethereal tests of jurisdiction under the "maritime but local"
doctrine evolved by the Jensen line of cases have satisfied many writers
that the primary "uniformity" achieved as a result of these cases was a
uniformity in unpredictability of result,"' and they have recommended
that the Supreme Court overrule the Jensen line of cases as a necessary
first step in achieving some semblance of rational predictability for the
harbor worker with respect to his claims for personal injuries against his
114 Mr. justice Holmes stated:
It is true that for most purposes, as the word is commonly used, stevedores are not
"seamen" but words are flexible .... We cannot believe that Congress willingly would
have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to vary
with the accident of their being employed by a stevedore rather than by the ship.
Id. at 52.
115 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1946).
116 In 1948, for example, Congress removed all maximum limitations previously applicable
to the total amounts of compensation payable in cases of death and total permanent dis-
ability. 62 Stat. 603 (1948), 33 U.S.C. § 914(m) (Supp. 1952).
117 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). See also Grant Smith-Porter v.
Rohde, 357 U.S. 469 (1922).
118 See, Comment, 57 Yale L.J. 243 (1947).
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employer.11 In any event, the requirement of mere national uniformity
stated in the Jensen case would have flowed more naturally from the
commerce clause of the Constitution 2 ' than from the "admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" clause. This latter clause was not designed to
produce a national uniformity of relations between American harbor
workers and their American employers, but was intended to assure tran-
quil relations for the several states of the union in their dealings with
foreigners and foreign ships, 2 - particularly in the exercise of the in rem
proceeding.
Mr. Justice Holmes' 1926 decision in the Haverty case dubbed long-
shoremen "seamen" for the purpose of extending the compensation
features of the Jones Act to cover all longshoremen. His reasoning that
"Congress could not have intended" their recovery to depend on the
accident of whether they were employed by a ship or an independent con-
tractor, was an inaccurate reading of the legislative mind, for a year
later, in 1927, the Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Act speci-
fically excluded from its scope the "master or member of a crew of any
vessel." 122 Thus the harbor worker's right to recover damages for his
injuries in lieu of, or in addition to, the compensation provided under the
1927 Act is, as a practical matter, limited to those instances in which he
is employed by an independent contractor rather than directly by the
shipowner.'
23
119 The decision of the Supreme Court in Madruga v. Superior Court, 74 Sup. Ct. 298
(U.S. 1994) recognizing concurrent jurisdiction in the federal admiralty courts and in the
State courts for suits for sale of a vessel for partition against suggests the possibility that the
present Supreme Court would reverse the Jensen case if the question were again presented.
Mr. justice Black, in affirming the constitutionality of state unemployment compensation
taxes as applied to seamen's wages, Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943),
commented: The Jensen case has already been severely limited and has no vitality beyond
that which may continue as to state workmen's compensation laws." Id. at 309.
120 It should be noted that the Court never found it necessary to go so far to insure
uniformity under the commerce clause in the absence of -expression by Congress.
121 Hamilton, "The Powers of the Judiciary," The Federalist, No. 80: (McLean's ed. 1788).
It is interesting to note in this regard that the Supreme Court felt it necessary to secure
uniformity as to workmen's compensation for harbor workers, but it did not find it necessary
to insure uniformity as to recoveries in death actions, with the result that the heirs of a pass-
enger negligently killed on a vessel within the three mile limit off Northern California must
bring suit within one year, but may recover full compensatory damages, while, if the vessel
had crossed into the waters of the State of Oregon, the heirs would have two years within
which to bring their action, but their recovery would be limited to a maximum of $20,000.
See Sherlock v. Aling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
122 Organized seamen (mariners) have steadfastly opposed coverage by a system of work-
men's compensation, Hust v. Moore-McCormack, 328 U.S. 707 (1946), 1946 A.M.C. 727;
Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949), 1949 A.M.C. 613.
123 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1946), stating the exclusive liability of the em-
ployer to be as provided in the Longshoremen's Compensation Act.
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HARBOR WORKER VS. SIOWNER
The technical jurisdictional problems which the harbor worker must
solve under the "maritime but local" doctrine, in securing recovery for
his personal injuries, is a major one, but the questions of greatest practical
and economic importance to the harbor worker (and other groups in the
shipping community) arise when the harbor worker seeks recovery from
persons other than his employer. Although harbor workers in some trades
are customarily employed directly by the shipowner and in other trades
the work of loading cargoes and stores is wholly or partially performed
by the crew, the vast majority of harbor workers are employed by local
independent contractors engaged by the shipowner to load or discharge
cargo or perform other work in connection with the vessel. Except in
rare cases.24 the very fact that the work is performed on the ship restricts
the harbor worker to a claim against the shipowner if he is to recover
compensation in excess of that provided by the Longshoremen's Act.
The employees of the independent stevedore contractor usually work
independently of the ship's crew and consequently are seldom injured by
the "operating" negligence of the vessel personnel, but when such in-
juries occur, American courts have consistently recognized the longshore-
man's claim and treated him as a business invitee of the shipowner. In
some such cases, the longshoreman has been held subject to the defense
that the crew member's negligence causing injury was that of a fellow
employee of the longshoreman under the doctrine of "borrowed serv-
ant." 125 The "borrowed servant" doctrine, in a reverse form, is suggested
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate concurrence in the Hawn case, in
which he expresses the view that the assimilation of harbor workers to
seamen with respect to seaworthiness necessarily assimilates harbor work-
ers to seamen with respect to crew negligence and bars harbor workers
from recovery against the shipowner for "operating" negligence. 26 The
majority rejected this view on the ground that the Sieracki case intended
to increase rather than limit the longshoreman's remedies.
As a statistical matter virtually no harbor workers are injured through
the "operating" negligence of the ship's crew and, as a result, virtually
all personal injury litigation between harbor workers on the one hand and
124 United States v. Luehr, 208 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1953), 1953 A.M.C. 2189 (injury re-
sulted from negligence of operator of floating derrick employed by charterer loading ship.)
125 United States v. Wallace, 18 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1927), 1927 A.M.C. 672; Standard Oil
Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909).
126 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1, 113. The theory
advanced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter had previously been rejected without opinion by Judge
Oliver J. Carter in overruling exceptions to a libel in Zapien v. Royal Rotterdam Lloyd,
Admiralty no. 26527 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1953).
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shipowners on the other is premised on the shipowner's alleged failure to
provide a safe place to work.
Even prior to the decision in Leathers v. Blessing, in 1882, in which the
Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdiction of admiralty over negligent injury
to a business invitee on board ship, the admiralty courts had permitted
longshoremen employees of independent stevedore contractors to recover
from the ship or shipowner where injuries resulted from negligence in
occasioning a hazardous condition aboard the ship. 127
It was universally recognized that the shipowner and vessel owed some
duty of care with respect to the safety of the place in which the employees
of the independent contractor were required to perform their work,128
but the longshoremen's independent contractor employer was held to be
under a similar obligation to provide his employee with a safe place to
work.'29 The seemingly limitless controversy and complexity that attends
personal injury litigation between harbor workers and shipowners is at-
tributable in part to a difficulty in resolving the respective scopes of the
shipowner's obligation in connection with the condition of the vessel to
the longshoreman as a "business invitee," and the obligation of the inde-
pendent stevedore contractor as employer of the longshoreman to exer-
cise due diligence to furnish his employee a "safe place to work." This
problem has been additionally complicated by the tendency of some courts
to confuse the doctrine of "safe place to work" with the doctrine of "sea-
worthiness." The complexity of litigation between harbor workers and
shipowners has been further augmented by the startling dicta in some
recent cases that the nature of the work' and the exclusive liability
provision of the Federal Longshoremen's Compensation Act' 3 ' relieves
127 Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882). See Gerrity v. The Bark Kate Cann, 2 Fed.
241 (E.D.N.Y. 1880), in which a longshoreman grain trimmer, employed by a grain elevator
engaged in loading a vessel for the charterer's account, was injured when a rack of dunnage
broke and fell of its own weight "by reason of neglect in the manner of stowing" by the
ship's officers.
128 The Hellos, 12 Fed. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) (small open ladder hatch in unusual location
in cargo hold which vessel's mate did not mention in telling stevedore foreman hold was ready
to commence working cargo); The Max Morris, 24 Fed. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (small opening
in ship's rail which, by location and appearance, seemed to be the access to a ladder, although
no ladder was provided); Keliher v. The Nebo, 40 Fed. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) (longshoreman
injured by the collapse of a beam supplied by the ship in the face of master's knowledge that
it was too weak to carry the intended burden).
129 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Inbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); Seaboard Stevedoring Corp.
v. Sagadahoc S.S. Co., 32 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1929); Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605,
608 (2d Cir. 1946) ("The primary duty to furnish its employees a safe place to work rested
with the stevedore.")
130 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95, and 12 (1946); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1.
131 Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1950) ("its [the
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the independent contractor employer of all duty to his employees as to the
safety of the place in which they work.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Pope & Talbot v. Hawn,"3 2 per-
sonal injury litigation between harbor workers and shipowners in the
common law courts was additionally unpredictable because of the uncer-
tainty of the effect to be given the harbor workers' own contributory
negligence. In 1890 the Supreme Court had held that the contributory
negligence of a longshoreman who prosecuted his suit in the admiralty
court would not completely bar his recovery. 133 Both before and after
this case the Supreme Court in collision cases prosecuted in common law
courts stated that recovery would be barred if there were mutual fault. 34
The lower Federal courts and the State courts regarded the effect to be
accorded contributory negligence as a matter of procedure to be deter-
mined by the forum, and in actions prosecuted in the common law courts,
cited contributory negligence as the ground for denying recovery in colli-
sion' 35 and maritime personal injury cases' 36 until the Supreme Court in
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack,'37 in 1942, first clearly indicated its view
that in maritime actions all admiralty rules which substantially affect the
prospect of recovery are deemed part of the "right" and not subject to
modification by the forum. Following the principles expressed in the
Garrett case, the Supreme Court of California in the case of Intagliata v.
Shipowners & Merchants Tugboat Co. 3 ' applied the admiralty rule of
divided damages in a collision case rather than the California State rule.
This decision was followed by the Second Circuit in holding that contri-
butory negligence is no bar to recovery in maritime actions, even though
brought on the law side of the court, thereby reversing its prior decisions
independent contractor's) duty to discover patent defects in such equipment was owed only
to its employees and that duty the Longshoremen's Act abolished, substituting therefor an
absolute duty to pay compensation.")
132 346 U.S. 406 (1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1.
133 The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
134 Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893) ; see also note 130 infra.
135 Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Nelson, 41 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1930), 1930 A.M.C. 1386.
136 Johnson v. U.S.S.B., 24 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1928), 1928 A.M.C. 987, disaffirming dictum
in Port of N.Y. Stevedoring Corp. v. Castagna, 280 Fed. 618 (2d Cir. 1922). See also In re
Penn. R.R., 48 F.2d 559, 566 (2d Cir. 1931), 1931 A.M.C. 852, 863, in which Judge Learned
Hand stated:
We can see no escape therefore from concluding that as between a common law court
and a court of admiralty, the question is treated as one of procedure, though in general
the law is otherwise.
137 317 U.S. 239 (1942), in which the Supreme Court held that the State courts must
apply the federal admiralty rule that the shipowner must carry the burden of proving fair
dealing as to a seaman's release rather than the State rule in which the seaman plahmitiff was
required to prove fraud or mistake.
138 26 Cal.2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1946), 1946 A.M.C. 263.
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on the subject."3 9 In stating its clear holding in the Hawn case, that con-
tributory negligence of a harbor worker injured on shipboard does not
bar his recovery in a suit on the law side of the Federal court before a
jury, the Supreme Court in a footnote suggested comparison of the Garrett
case with Belden v. Chase.4 ' It is possible that the Supreme Court in-
tends its footnote reference as a caveat of its intention to disaffirm its prior
statements on the subject' 41 and in the future to treat contributory negli-
gence as a factor in mitigation rather than as a bar in all maritime actions,
including collision cases, regardless of the choice of forum.
The problem arising from the duality and partial overlapping of the
duties owed by the shipowner and the stevedore employer to the harbor
worker are primarily factual in nature and on the basis of a factual approach
have been satisfactorily resolved in the Second and Third Circuits through
the application of traditionally understood and accepted principles of
law.'4 2 In general, and without regard to the theory of absolute liability
evolved in the Sieracki case, the Second and Third Circuits have pro-
ceeded on the principle that the duty of due care with respect to the con-
dition of the vessel is owed the harbor worker by his employer or the
shipowner depending upon which one in the factual circumstances of the
particular case had control of the portion of the vessel involved and was
in the best position to avoid causing, or to remedy, the condition which
caused the injury.'43 These circuits have applied much the same factual
approach in imposing or withholding liability under the "seaworthiness"
doctrine, holding that the shipowner has fully discharged his obligation
to furnish a seaworthy vessel to the harbor worker if the vessel is sea-
worthy when control of the portion involved is surrendered to the master
stevedore. If thereafter the vessel's fabric or equipment becomes "unsea-
139 Hedger v. United Fruit Co., 198 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1952), 1952 A.M.C. 1469, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 896 (1952), 1952 A.M.C. 2086.
140 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
141 In Atlee v. N.W. Union Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 395 (U.S. 1875), the Supreme Court
said:
By the rule of the admiralty court where there has been such contributory negligence,
or, in other words, when both have been at fault, the entire damages resulting from the
collision must be equally divided between the parties. This rule of the admiralty com-
mends itself quite as favorably in its influence in securing practical justice as the other;
and a plaintiff who has the selection of the forum in which he will litigate cannot com-
plain of the rule of that forum .... Each court has its own set of rules for determining
these questions which may be in some respects the same but in others vary materially.
142 Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1945), 1945 A.M.C. 559; Lopex v. Amer.
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1945), 1953 A.M.C. 428; Rogers v. United States
Line Co., 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953), 1953 A.M.C. 1679.
143 Cornec v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 48 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1931), 1931 A.M.C. 721, concern-
ing an explosion which occurred in 1927 prior to the Longshoremen's Act, the court held the
stevedore employer liable for negligent failure to provide a safe place to work but held the
vessel and vessel owner not liable to the injured longshoreman.
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worthy," the longshoreman is held without recovery against the ship-
owner. It is, this factual approach, sometimes referred to as the "relin-
quishment of control" doctrine, which the Ninth Circuit rejected in the
Petterson case144 and which the majority of the Supreme Court apparently
also rejected in affirming without opinion the decision of the Ninth Circuit
in the Petterson case.145
The major legal and practical questions in harbor workers' personal
injury litigation all derive in part from the Supreme Court's classification
of certain harbor workers as "seamen" with accompanying absolute right
to recover from the shipowner for unseaworthiness. The practical im-
portance of the legal questions is heightened in every instance by the
Longshoremen's Act which precludes the harbor worker from suing his
employer for damages. Although statistically only an infinitesimal num-
ber of harbor workers are injured as a result of "latent defects" in vessels
or equipment, the assimilation of harbor workers to seamen and the
phrasing of the shipowner's obligation of seaworthiness in terms of an
absolute liability is a measurably valuable asset of the harbor worker, in
the same sense that it is a measurably valued asset of the true mariner,
primarily in that it enables the harbor worker to obtain adjudication of
his suit for damages for personal injuries in an atmosphere and context
of "absolute liability." The means by which the Supreme Court has
achieved this favored status for harbor workers is not only dramatic but
proves the efficacy of the judicial quasi-legislative function in a manner
that prompts speculation whether it would be within the power of Con-
gress to achieve a similarly favored status for any group of shoreside
workers.
HARBOR WORcER ALIAS "SEAMAN" VS. SHIPOWNER
The' mariner's "warranty of seaworthiness" with its concomitants of
"absolute liability" and favored status in litigation has been held by the
Supreme Court to follow the appellation "seaman," 146 and the determina-
tion of which groups of harbor workers will merit the accolade is therefore
a matter of great practical and economic importance.
144 Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1405, cert.
granted, 346 U.S. 914 (1953), aff'd mem. sub nom. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc. v. Petterson, 74 Sup.
Ct. 601 (1954).
145 Affirmed without majority opinion April 5, 1954, 74 Sup. Ct. 601 (1954); the lack of a
majority opinion to support the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
the Petterson case makes it impossible to state with certainty whether the Supreme Court
majority has rejected the "relinquishment of control" doctrine or whether the affirmance was
based on some less controversial, factual ground appearing in the record.
146 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406 (1953), 1954 A.M.C. 1.
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In his opinion in the Haverty case, 147 Mr. Justice Holmes conceded that
as words are commonly used, longshoremen are not "seamen," but ob-
served that longshore work was a maritime service "formerly rendered by
the ship's crew" 148 and rested his decision on the "flexibility" of words
and on his mistaken belief that Congress did not intend mariners to be
treated differently from longshoremen under the Jones Act. Mr. Justice
Holmes was as mistaken in his assumption that longshore work was "for-
merly rendered by the ship's crew," as he was in his insight into Congres-
sional intent. But, while Congress promptly restated its actual intent
through passage of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act of 1927, his other mistake, as to the nature and histori-
cal antecedents of longshore work, remained uncorrected and available for
later perpetuation in the Sieracki case. In the Sieracki case the court gave
longshoremen the benefit of a theory of shipowner's absolute liability for
unseaworthiness on the holding that "for these purposes he is, in short, a
seaman because he is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's
hazards," 149 resting this holding on its factual premise that, "Historically
the work of loading and unloading is the work of the ship's service, per-
formed until recent times by members of the crew." 150 The premise is
plausible-the mind's eye readily visualizes the ancient mariner loading
147 Intl. Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
148 Citing Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
149 328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946), 1946 A.M.C. 698, 708 (1946).
150 328 U.S. 85, 96, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 705. Florez v. The Scotia, 35 Fed. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1888), a stevedore's lien case, in which Judge Addison Brown said, "Formerly the labor of
unloading was performed by seamen, whose lien was never questioned.... The vessels of
some nations are still discharged here by their own seamen." Ibid. The Gilbert Knapp, 37
Fed. 209 (E.D.Wis. 1889), in which Judge Jenkins, while affirming the maritime nature
of stevedoring services, said, "The stevedore stands in no such relation to the ship as a
mariner. He is neither bound to like control, subject to like liabilities, nor are his rights so
peculiarly protected by statute. His services are not connected with the navigation of the
ship." Id. at 214. The Seguranca, 58 Fed. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), in which Judge Addison
Brown, while denying a maritime lien to a watchman contractor, said, "These men are mere
substitutes for seamen, who formerly did, and often still do, the same work, and have a lien
therefor." Id. at 909. Judge Addison Brown's language in The Scotia, in 1888, which is the
earliest expression of judicial view regarding the historical facts of working cargo, was re-
phrased in somewhat more dogmatic language in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234
U.S. 52, 62 (1914), where the court said, "in affirming the jurisdiction of an admiralty court
to hear a longshoremen's suit for personal injury, formerly the work was done by the ship's
crew .... " The language in the Imbrovek case was relied upon heavily by the Supreme
Court and quoted extensively in Footnote 15 to the Sieracki opinion. The earliest reference
to any contention that the work of loading and discharging vessels was formerly done by
the ship's crew appears in McDermott v. The S.C. Owens, 16 Fed. Cas. 15, No. 8,748
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1849), in which counsel, contending for a maritime lien for stevedore services,
urged that formerly mariners performed the service, which argument Circuit Judge Grier
dubbed "ingenious" but rejected, stating, "it wants the support of authority." Id. at 16.
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his own ship-but mistaken. The statement would be in part true if
limited to the statement that on some vessels in some trades some mariners
sometimes have done some of the loading and unloading of the vessels-
and so limited the statement would be equally true today. In San Fran-
cisco Harbor, for example, the great bulk of the work of loading and un-
loading vessels now is done by longshoremen employees of independent
stevedore contractors, and proportionately more of such work is per-
formed by the ship's crews of today than in the Gold Rush days when the
crews deserted immediately on arrival and did no cargo work.
Throughout recorded history shoreside contractors and shoreside labor
have performed the work of loading and unloading vessels. From the
dawn of the Christian era, stevedores (geruli) 151 were organized in
unions; through the earlier 5 2 and later' Middle Ages, the days of
Charles I,154 the birth of the American Constitution155 and down to the
present time shoreside labor has been and is employed to do the work of
loading and discharging cargoes. When the Supreme Court's basic prem-
ise is modified as required to avoid violence to historical fact, no factual
basis remains for assimilating the harbor worker to the mariner. Man
may have evolved from the coelacanth, but through all of recorded history
the harbor worker has been a land creature.
Following the assimilation of longshoremen to seamen by the Supreme
Court in the Sieracki decision, the lower courts generally tended to treat
151 Roman harbor workers were organized in guilds or unions and from the ancient in-
scriptions prior to 100 AfD. records have been preserved establishing the existence of guilds
of Ballast Loaders (Saburrarii), Stevedores (Geruli), Amphorae Porters (Palangarii) and
Unloaders of Sacked Grain (Saccarii). 5 Frank, an Economic Survey of Ancient Rome 249-
250 (1940).
152 Laws of Oleron, Art. XXI, 30 Fed. Cas. 1180 (c. 1150 A.D.).
153 Laws of Wisbuy, Arts. XXXIV, LII, 30 Fed. Cas. 1192 (c. 1266 A.D.).
154 Cleirac, Les Us. et Coutumes de la Mer (1647), Observation to Article XI of the Laws
of Oleron (30 Fed. Cas. 1177), observing that the stowage of goods was left exclusively to
professional workers and also noting the antiquity of professional stowers known as "sac-
quiers" as referred to in the 14th Book of the Theodosian Code.
155 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755, No. 3,930 (D.Pa. 1789):
But if the owner or captain, as is frequently the case, shall find it more for his interest
to hire men on daily pay to unload the ship than to keep the crew under monthly wages
and find them with provisions in port, he may certainly release the mariner from this
part of his duty.
Id. at 757.
Swift v. The Happy Return, 23 Fed. Cas. 560, No. 13,697 (D.Pa. 1799):
In this port, it is the general custom to hire others than the mariners to lade and unlade
vessels. The merchants find it more for their interests to do so than to depend on the
mariners who are particularly ungovernable after a voyage is ended; and are, when
arrived at home, impatient under confinement to the drudgery of unlading the cargo.
*.. These authorities (Laws of Wisbuy) show that there is a distinction in the mari-
time laws between the wages for navigation and those allowed for loading and unload-
ing; the latter being considered independent and distinct services from the former.
Id. at 561.
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as "seamen" all harbor workers who were engaged in "ship's service,"'15
while the Second Circuit, following Judge Learned Hand's views, refused
to extend the appellation "seamen" to harbor workers other than long-
shoremen. 5 7 In the Hawn case the majority of the Supreme Court ex-
tended the benefits of the doctrine of "insured seaworthiness" to a
carpenter employee of an independent contractor who, at the time of his
injury, was engaged in adjusting a wooden chute used in the loading of
grain. It cannot be determined from Mr. Justice Black's opinion whether
the decision turns on the fact that Hawn's work was in some way related
to the loading of the vessel or whether it turns on the fact that Hawn's
mere presence on board exposed him to shipboard hazards.
If the Supreme Court has adopted "nature of work" as the test for
determining whether particular groups of harbor workers should be assim-
ilated to "seamen," it has promulgated a rule which will compare fa-
vorably with its "maritime but local" doctrine in unpredictability and
impossibility of rational application. As has been frequently pointed out,
the mariners who are bound by contract to the vessel and subject to the
seafarer's hazards and discipline include every coniceivable trade, not only
the sailor, but cooks, waiters, hairdressers, manicurists, nurses, doctors
and bartenders.' It may be noted that there is reputable authority that
the services which even a mariner on articles may perform in working
cargo are not "seamen's services," particularly if performed in the home
port at the commencement of the voyage or at the final port of dis-
charge.
159
If, on the other hand, the majority proposes to treat as "seamen" and
thereby extend the doctrine of "insured seaworthiness" to all who are
exposed to shipboard port hazards, the infinitude of speculative possibili-
ties precludes comment. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme
156 Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952) (carpenter); Capadona v.
Lake Atlin, 101 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.Cal. 1951) (employee of oil fuel barge on vessel tempo-
rarily); Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E.D.Mo. 1951) (employee
of grain elevator company).
157 Guerrini v. United States, 167 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1948); Rich v. United States, 192
F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1951).
158 Cassil v. U.S. Emergency Fleet Corp., 289 Fed. 774 (9th Cir. 1923), 1923 A.M.C. 655.
Generally speaking, a seaman is anyone who by contractual engagement with the owner,
master or charterer of a vessel serves the vessel in navigation. He is not necessarily a
sailor. He may be a cook, fireman, or even a bartender. A stevedore renders no service
in actual navigation.
Id. at 776, 1923 A.M.C. at 647.
159 Laws of Wisbuy, Arts. V and XLVIII, 30 Fed. Cas. 1190, 1193 (C. 1266); Swift v.
The Happy Return, 23 Fed. Cas. 560, No. 13,697 (D.Pa. 1799); Phillips v. The Thomas
Scattergood, 19 Fed. Cas. 523, No. 11,106 (E.D.Pa. 1828); The Brookline, 4 Fed. Cas. 236,




Court had previously rejected nature or the hazard of work as a test for
determining the scope of admiralty jurisdiction with respect to injuries
occurring on vessels in navigable waters. 160
In their well-documented and forceful dissent in the Hawn case Justices
Jackson, Reed and Burton point out that the logic which justifies special
treatment of the seafaring worker bound to the vessel in her voyage does
.not extend to shoreside harbor workers and that neither Congressional
will, maritime law, nor common sense justify mingling the two wholly
separate types of labor in their remedies for personal injuries.
The decision in the Hawn case derives directly from the three primary
propositions stated in the Sieracki decision:
1. That as a matter of law the mariner had an absolute right to re-
cover damages from the fault-free shipowner for injuries resulting from
"unseaworthiness" of the vessel;
2. That as a matter of historical fact the work of loading and unload-
ing cargoes was performed until recent times by members of the crew; and
3. That as a matter of quasi-legislative policy the shipowner "is in
position, as the worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping com-
munity .... "
The first proposition is a mistake of law deriving solely and directly
from repetition of inaccurately-worded dicta.'' The second proposition,
although a priori attractively plausible, is opposed to the historical fact,
while the third is questionable both as a matter of fact and. as a matter
of policy.
With respect to the third proposition that the shipowner is in an advan-
tageous position to distribute the loss through the shipping community it
may be noted preliminarily that in many instances, as in the Hawn case,
the shipowner, although manning and navigating the vessel, has surren-
dered control of the vessel, as an instrumentality of commerce, to a char-
terer. Under time charters, which are in common usage, the shipowner has
no control of the ports at which cargo is loaded, the number of times
cargo will be loaded or the contractors or workmen that will be employed
to do such loading. Such contingencies render it beyond scope of actuarial
skill to compute a proper premium. Additionally, the modern trend of the
law has been to treat the award of damages as largely a matter of fact to
be determined by the jury. The practical effect of this trend has been
160 Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), (holding that work by
a carpenter on a ship launched and afloat but still under construction was "maritime but
local" and subject to the Workmen's Compensation Statute of the State of Oregon).
161 Cf. Brave New World, and Aldous Huxley's observation therein that 20,000 repetitions
make one truth.
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that damages in personal injury cases by and large are limited only by the
eloquence of the plaintiff's attorney. 6 ' This factor, in conjunction with
the certainty of being confronted in the trial of every case with an atmos-
phere of "absolute liability," and the actuarial impossibility of computing
a proper premium, in recent years have contributed to the withdrawal of
one insurance company after another from the writing of liability insur-
ance of the type that covers shipowners against claims of the kind in
question. 163
Those insurance companies which remain in the field now consent to
write such insurance, either only at prohibitive premiums, or only on
terms which require the shipowner to bear the full expense of each claim
which does not exceed a specified "deductible"--which frequently is in
the range of $10,000-$20,000 per claim. Thus, in a very practical and
literal sense, the "distributive" task which the Supreme Court has as-
signed the shipowner must be accomplished by the shipowner individually
in its commercial operation and not as a mere matter of buying insurance.
All of the independent contractor employers of harbor workers carry in-
surance to cover their liability under the Longshoremen's Act, and the
cost of such insurance is included in the rates which they charge to the
shipowner or charterer engaging them. The premiums for coverage under
the Longshoremen's Act run approximately $7.00 per $100.00 of payroll.
This payment, which is more or less readily calculable, finds its way into
the shipowner's rate computation, but the shipowner's rate computation
must also include a substantial amount to apply against the claims of the
injured harbor worker who elects to proceed against the shipowner for
"unseaworthiness" in addition to his rights against his employer under
the Longshoremen's Act. The inevitable result is that the shipowner pays
twice for every personal injury judgment recovered against it by a harbor
worker, having already paid once in the rate charged by the independent
contractor. The extent to which the resultant "double charge" can be
passed on to the shipping public is limited by international economic facts
over which the shipowner has no control. For example, in the export trade
a difference of only two or three cents in the freight rate frequently will
determine whether the foreign buyer secures his goods from an American
or a European source. 6 ' When the freight rate which the shipowner is
required to set exceeds the economic limit, the goods are not shipped.
Although the question is impossible of accurate statistical analysis, it
162 Belli, "The Adequate Award," 39 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
163 The National Underwriter, Jan. 28, 1954. Seven insurance companies have withdrawn
from one trade in the past eight years and premium rates have increased 600% since 1945.
164 U.S.M.C. Docket 657, 1947, Record, pp. 316-318; see also Fortune, p. 69, March, 1954.
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seems certain that to a greater or lesser extent the shipowner's court-im-
posed task of "distributing the loss" has resulted in "distributing" the
work as well as the loss from the American harbor worker to harbor work-
ers in competing countries.
The "double payment" for many harbor worker injuries which the
shipowner presently must make by reason of the two "non-fault" remedies
available to the harbor worker may be avoided by the shipowner only by
placing itself in the position of the direct employer of the harbor worker,
which shipowners in several instances have attempted to accomplish to
the extent practically possible.
The problem is a perhaps difficult one, but, as has been recognized
since the Sieracki case first appeared,1 65 the assimilation of harbor work-
ers to seamen compounds rather than simplifies the problem.
A vigorous minority of the Supreme Court now recognizes that there is
no rational or legal basis for classifying harbor workers as "seamen." In
view of the mistake of fact upon which the Supreme Court bases its pres-
ent assimilation of harbor workers to seamen, it may be predicted that
eventually the court willrecognize that "seamen" are those who go to sea.
SHIPOWNER VS. CONTRACTOR-EMPLO-ER
The harbor worker can no longer recover damages from his em-
ployer,' 66 as he could prior to the Longshoremen's Act,' 67 and his only
recourse for damages, in most factual situations, is against the shipowner.
In order to establish his right to recover from the shipowner, the harbor
worker in a great majority of cases must prove the "unseaworthiness" of
the vessel-but, having established that his injuries were caused by "un-
seaworthiness" he may recover from the shipowner, even in the absence of
negligence or other fault on the shipowner's part.
1 68
Because of the physical circumstances under which the work is usually
performed, the neglect or oversight of other employees of the independent
contractor frequently contributes to the accident which causes injury.
Even in the days when the shipowner's duty to the harbor worker was
stated in terms of "due care to a business invitee," the shipowner would
seek recoupment of the damages he had paid the injured harbor worker
165 Comment, "The Tangled Seine," 57 Yale L. J. 243, 272 (1947).
166 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1946).
167 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); Cornec v. Baltimore & 0.
RR., 48 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1931), 1931 A.M.C. 721.
168 United States v. Arrow Stevedore Co., 175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1949), 1949 A.M.C.
1444 (falling of defective tank cover where shipowner had instructed stevedore contractor
not to work hatch until after cover was repaired); see also Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946), 1946 A.M.C. 698.
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from the independent contractor employer in those cases where the inde-
pendent contractor's negligence had contributed to the injury. The ship-
owner's interest in attempting to recoup a portion of his loss from the
negligent contractor is redoubled in those cases where liability has been
imposed on the shipowner under the current doctrine of "insured sea-
worthiness," without fault on the shipowner's part.
The duty of the independent contractor to use reasonable diligence to
provide a safe place of work for his employees was universally recognized,
and in those cases where the unsafe condition was caused by.the inde-
pendent contractor's employees and liability was visited on the shipowner
solely because of a passively negligent failure in its non-delegable duty to
provide a safe place to work, the shipowner would seek and recover from
the independent contractor full indemnity for the damages it had been
required to pay the harbor worker.169
On the other hand, where the injury was in part caused by the defective
equipment supplied by the shipowner and in part by the independent con-
tractor's negligence in overstraining or misusing the equipment or in fail-
ing to inspect and warn its employees of patent defects in equipment, the
cases were treated as other "mutual fault" cases in admiralty and the
shipowner was permitted to recoup a contribution, usually one-half of the
damages paid, from the independent contractorY.
7 0
The cases allowing full indemnity (where liability was visited on the
shipowner solely as a result of its passive failure to observe or correct a
dangerous condition arising solely through the neglect of the stevedore
contractor's employees), rest on principles well grounded in all branches
of the law and have not been seriously questioned. 171 The contention has
169 Seaboard Stevedoring Corporation v. Sagadahoc S.S. Co., 32 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1929)
(employee of another stevedoring company was injured as a result of appellant stevedoring
company's improper placement of hatch covers, the shipowner recovering full indemnity).
Compare, United States v. Arrow Stevedore Co., 175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1949), 1949 A.M.C.
1444; United States v. Rothschild Int'l. Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950), 1950
A.M.C. 1332.
170 The Tampico, 45 F.Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F.Supp. 574
(N.C.Cal. 1947), 1947 A.M.C. 1046; Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 82 F.Supp. 285 (D. Me. 1949);
Portel v U.S., 85 F.Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews,
87 F.Supp. 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), 1950 A.M.C. 303 (patently defective rope belonging to
vessel which stevedore contractor failed to inspect), reversed, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950),
1950 A.M.C. 1272 (on ground that under Longshoremen's Act shipowner and stevedore con-
tractor could not be "joint" tort feasors and that, by reason of Longshoremen's Act, stevedore
contractor owed no duty to inspect equipment furnished by vessel). Barbarino v. Stanhope
S.S. Co., 151 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1945).
171 Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); Standard Oil
Co. v. Robbins Drydock & Repair Co., 32 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1929); Burris v. Am. Chicle,
120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1951) ; States S.S. Co. v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d
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been made, however, that even in such cases the exclusive remedy provi-
sion of the Longshoremen's Act precludes any recoupment against the
employer other than that stated in the Act.'
The cases permitting contribution (where the injuries resulted from the
mutual fault of the shipowner and the stevedore contractor) were first
repudiated by the Second Circuit in Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Mat-
thews,' 73 in which the court denied contribution to the shipowner from the
stevedore employer of the injured longshoreman on the ground that a right
of contribution can arise only where there is a common liability to the
injured person and that, under the Longshoremen's Act, the stevedore
employer was under no liability to pay damages to his injured employee.
The court in its opinion, written by Judge Swan, further stated that the
stevedore-contractor's duty to its employees to discover patent defects in
equipment supplied by the shipowner had been abolished by the Long-
shoremen's Act which substituted a duty to pay compensation. Judge
Swan's language in the Mattkews case should be compared with his lan-
guage in Porello v. United States74 on the question of the stevedore's duty
to his employees, but decided four years earlier.
The trend commenced in the Second Circuit with the Matthews case
was continued, with modifications, by the Third Circuit in the case of
Baccile v. Halcyon Lines,'7 5 which permitted the negligent shipowner to
253 (9th Cir. 1953), 1953 A.M.C. 1399, noted with approval, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 884 (1954);
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester Estates, 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
172 States SS. Co. v. Rothschild Int'l. Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1953), 1953
A.M.C. 1399, noted with approval, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 884 (1954); United States v. Arrow,
175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1949), 1949 A.M.C. 1444.
173 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950), 1950 A.M.C. 1272. See also Shannon v. United States,
1954 A.M.C. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
174 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), 1946 A.M.C. 163. The shipowner had negligently failed
to provide a lock on the "strongback" or hatch beam and the contractor, having knowledge
that the lock was missing, negligently proceeded to work cargo, resulting in the dropping of
the strongback causing the injuries. The court said:
The primary duty to furnish its employees a safe place to work rested on the stevedore.
It was in control of the conditions under which the work was to be done and its fore-
man knew the bolt was missing and should have foreseen the danger and avoided it.
Id. at 608, 1946 A.M.C. at 167.
175 89 F.Supp 765 (E.D.Pa. 1950), modified by Bacille v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 405
(3d Cir. 1951), reversed by Halcyon Lines v. Haenn, 342 U.S. 282 (1952), 1952 A.M.C. 1.
Bacille, an employee of Haenn Ship Ceiling Corp. was injured when staging left in the ves-
sel's hold by a stevedoring company collapsed under his weight. Stipulated judgment in the
amount of $65,000 was entered against the shipowner and the trial proceeded for the sole
purpose of determining the ultimate liability as between the shipowner and the Haenn Ship
Ceiling Co. The accident resulted in part from the defective staging and in part from the
manner in which Carpenter Baccile's employer Haenn directed him to make use of it. The
jury found the negligence causing the accident was attributable 25% to the shipowner and
75% to the carpenter's employer. The District Court apportioned damages on a moiety basis
and gave the shipowner judgment against Haenn for 50% of the carpenter's judgment against
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recover from the negligent contractor only the amount that the contractor
would otherwise have been obligated to pay as compensation under the
Longshoremen's Act. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn, reversed the Third Circuit and denied all right of contribution,
resting its decision solely on the stated ground that it never previously
had recognized a right of contribution in admiralty except in collision
cases and that it was unwilling to attempt to fashion "new" judicial rules
of contribution in the absence of being wholly convinced that such action
would best serve the ends of justice.
1 7 6
The right to enforce contribution in maritime tort cases had previously
been affirmed so uniformly in such a variety of situations17 7 that the
decision in the Halcyon case was and is generally regarded as stating a
radically new rule, rather than as expressing adherence to an old rule.
Specifically, this decision appears to be a repudiation of the rather strong
statements of admiralty principle expressed by the Supreme Court in
The Max Morris' in which the rule of comparative negligence was an-
it. The shipowner and Haenn Corporation both appealed, the third circuit holding that the
shipowner was entitled to contribution from Haenn but only in the amount that Haenn Cor-
poration would otherwise have been obligated to pay its injured employee under the Long-
shoremen's Act. Both parties applied for certiorari, the shipowner in part because it was not
content to bear 90% of the burden of the stipulated judgment in view of the jury's findings
thatits negligence was only 25% of the total fault contributing to the accident; the employer
in part because in the absence of an administrative proceeding and award under the Long-
Ishoremen's Act it was impossible to determine the amount that it would "otherwise have been
required to pay under the Longshoremen's Act."
176 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn, 342 U.S. 282 (1952), 1952 A.M.C. 1; Mr. justice Black
wrote the opinion for the Court; Justices Reed and Burton dissented with the notation that
they favored the decision of the District Court, i.e., the allowance of a 50% contribution.
177 The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1889) (The schooner Golden Rule being sunk by the
steamer Chattahoochee in a mutual fault situation and the cargo aboard the Golden Rule
being unable to recoup against that vessel by reason of the Harter Act and having recovered
its damages from the steamer, the steamer was permitted to offset one-half the amount paid
cargo against the claim for loss of the schooner); Erie R.R. v. Erie & Western Trans. Co.,
204 U.S. 220 (1907). The last cited case was a mutual fault collision case in which the non-
carrying vessel, having paid in full for the damage to cargo aboard the carrying vessel, re-
couped its moiety of the damages paid to cargo from the carrying vessel. Mr. justice Holmes
stated:
.. . and it is established, as it logically follows, that the division of damages extends to
what one of the parties pays to the owners of the cargo on board the other. . . . The
right to the division of the latter element does not stand on subrogation, but arises di-
rectly from the tort.
Id. at 226.
The rule of the common law, even, that there is no contribution between wrongdoers, is
subject to exception.... Whatever its origin, the admiralty rule in this county is well
known to be the other way.
Id. at 225.
178 The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) citing The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 17 (U.S.
1827) ("In the admiralty, the award of damages always rests in the sound discretion of the
court, under all the circumstances.") The holding in the Max Morris was that an injured
1954]
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nounced as the proper admiralty rule in personal injury cases. The lower
courts have received the rule in the Halcyon case with apparent reluctance
and there are indications that it will be limited in its application where
possible.17 9 The Supreme Court, however, cited the Halcyon decision in
the later Hawn case as its authority for denying contribution to the ship-
owner as against the employer despite the jury's finding that the negli-
gence of both had contributed to the accident.
The Hawn case denied contribution between joint tort feasors in ad-
miralty but also affirmed the application of the comparative negligence
rule to maritime personal injuries regardless of the plaintiff's choice of
forum. The affirmance in the same case of a rule of comparative negli-
gence with respect to the injured person and denial of a right of contribu-
tion between the concurrent wrongdoers exemplifies the lack of symmetry
which has characterized maritime tort law since the Jensen,80 case. A
rule permitting contribution among tort feasors is a logically necessary
corollary of a rule of comparative negligence, although the complementary
nature of the two rules has seldom been given express verbal recognition.
The necessary relationship between the two rules finds its practical recogni-
tion in the fact that those jurisdiction which recognize the one usually recog-
nize the other.' The rule of comparative negligence which the Supreme
Court affirmatively re-endorsed in the Hawn case necessarily acknowl-
edges the right of a tort feasor to recover from other tort feasors a portion
of the damage arising from the tort. The rule of law denying recovery to
a plaintiff who has been contributorily negligent and the rule of law deny-
ing contribution between joint tort feasors both have their bases in the
same policy concept that the law will not assist a wrongdoer in shifting
or distributing the burden of damage where his own wrong contributed to
the damage. A system of law which adopts the rule of comparative negli-
gence and rejects contributory negligence as a defense is necessarily and
inevitably a system of law which rejects the underlying concept that the
wrongdoer as such is barred from recouping a portion of his loss from
other contributing wrongdoers. Logic is baffled by the asymmetry of the
legal system which permits the negligent Hawn to recoup a portion of his
damage from the negligent shipowner, Pope & Talbot, but precludes the
negligent shipowner from recouping a portion of its loss from the negligent
longshoreman having sued in admiralty would not be barred by his contributory negligence
but that his negligence would operate to reduce his recovery of damages.
179 Union Sulphur Co. v. Jones, 195 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1952), 1952 A.M.C. 605; States S.S.
Co. v. Rothschild, 205 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1952), 1953 A.M.C. 1399.
180 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
181 E.g., See Wisc. Stat. § 331.045 (1951); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W.Ry. 167 Wis. 392, 167
N.W. 1048 (1918); Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. 354, 246 N.W. 691 (1933).
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contractor, Haenn Corporation. The Supreme Court apparently proposes
to continue to permit contribution in collision cases with the practical
result that the shipowner can secure contribution to personal injury judg-
ments obtained against it if the other wrongdoer is a shipowner, but not
otherwise.
The Hawn case, for the first time in any known system of law, accords
practical recognition to a doctrine of "profitable negligence." Under the
literal provisions of the Longshoremen's Act the injured Hawn was re-
quired, and agreed, to repay to his employer out of any judgment he
recovered against the shipowner the amount of all benefits he had received
from his employer under the Act. Hawn was negligent; his employer,
Haenn Corporation, was negligent; and shipowner, Pope & Talbot, was
negligent. But the Supreme Court rejected Pope & Talbot's plea that the
judgment against it be reduced by the amounts of the compensation re-
ceived by Hawn to avoid Haenn Corporation's escaping harmless from an
accident its own negligence had in part caused. Since Haenn Corpora-
tion's negligence was found a contributing factor in the accident, it is
possible that the accident might not have occurred but for Haenn's negli-
gence; nonetheless, because of the interpretation placed by the Supreme
Court on the operation of the Longshoremen's Act, and because of its
refusal to permit contribution, Haenn Corporation found itself fully in-
demnified and made no financial contribution to Hawn's damages, al-
though it would have had a relatively heavy financial burden under the
Longshoremen's Act 182 if its employee had been injured without negli-
gence on the part of anyone. Mr. Justice Holmes astutely observed that
the life of the common law "has not been logic; it has been experi-
ence." 183 Neither logic nor experience rationalizes the present posture
of the maritime law governing the relations between the shipowner 'and
the independent contractor employer with respect to harbor workers'
personal injuries. The rationalization can be found only in the Supreme
Court's quasi-legislative determination, presaged in the language of the
Sieracki opinion, that the shipowner should insofar as possible bear the
burden of all injuries occurring on shipboard.
SUMMARY
The plea for legislative inquiry and action in the Halcyon opinion is
reminiscent of the court's similar pleas for Congressional action in the
182 It will be noted that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was premised on the finding
that the vessel was "unseaworthy," which under the "non-fault" basis of liability presently
attributed by the Supreme Court to the doctrine of seaworthiness would result in the negligent
employer of the harbor worker remaining free of financial obligation at the expense of a ship-
owner wholly free of fault.
183 Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1948 ed.).
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cases following the Jensen decision. But it is questionable whether mere
Congressional action would be capable of resolving the present major legal
uncertainties and difficulties arising from harbor workers' shipboard
injuries. It is submitted that in major part the legal difficulties presently
attending the many faceted litigation which characteristically follows a
harbor worker's shipboard injury are attributable to (1) the Supreme
Court's inadvertent statement of the doctrine of "insured seaworthiness,"
(2) the extension of the doctrine of "insured seaworthiness" to harbor
workers on a mistaken factual assumption that until recent days mariners
performed harbor workers' services, (3) the Supreme Court's tentative
refusal on quasi-legislative "policy grounds" in the Halcyon case to recog-
nize contribution between joint tort feasors in non-collision cases, and (4)
the Jensen case, denying the applicability of state compensation statutes
to harbor workers' shipboard injuries.
The Supreme Court's reconsideration and revision of its views on the
first three points is not impeded by stare decisis as its present views in
each of the three do not appear to express direct judicial rulings on con-
troverted questions. The Jensen case has been so far limited in its scope
that its reversal would occasion only passing comment and no major tran-
sitional difficulty even in the field of Workmen's Compensation.
In a field where no measurable predictability presently obtains, such
re-examination and restatement would be beneficial to all litigants rather
than unsettling in its effect.
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